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Abstract 
 
 Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) is DoD' s preferred product support approach 
in order to satisfy vitally-important war fighter needs. The elasticity of these needs makes 
it impossible to build a one-fits-all template PBL contract with the contractors. Thus, 
both economic metrics such as Cost per Unit Usage and non-economic metrics such as 
Availability, Reliability, Logistics Foot Print and Logistics Response Time can be 
defined and tailored according to each individual program.  
However, evaluation of the success of a PBL contract gets harder proportional to 
the increased number of different types of metrics. This research suggests an integrated 
model approach for combining multiple criteria when assessing the success of a PBL 
contract.  
This approach may be used in operational-level decisions such as reward and 
penalty decisions within a contract, or strategic-level decisions such as extending the 
contract with the same contractor, terminating the contract and negotiating 
with other contractors.  
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A 4-STEP PROCESS EVALUATION MODEL TO ASSESS THE SUCCESS OF 
PERFORMANCE BASED LOGISTICS CONTRACTS  
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
 
 
 This thesis investigates and proposes an alternative approach to monitor the 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) supported systems both at the individual metrics 
level and at the whole system level. For this reason, the defined metrics of the PBL 
contracts are integrated in a mathematical model and that model is integrated into the 
current evaluation processes in order to build a theoretical model that would fill the 
defined gaps of the PBL evaluation processes.  In addition to that, opening a discussion 
among the academics and the acquisition professionals is intended.  
 First of all, the current study starts with reviewing the published sources and the 
experts’ opinions in order to build our foundation of PBL. Then, the gaps of the PBL 
literature are defined and the focus of the current study is stated. The focus of this study 
is to investigate and propose a reasonable approach for the evaluation process in PBL.  
 According to the knowledge that has been gained until that point, the scope and 
the assumptions of the study are defined and the investigative questions are determined. 
Next the methodology is described accordingly and the proposed model is built. Then the 
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model is evaluated, verified and validated. Next the model is applied to two real-life 
cases and the applicability and the usefulness is assessed.  
 Finally, the gathered results are analyzed and the core investigative questions 
answered with the relevant findings. Additionally, the experienced limitations and 
possible future studies are addressed.    
 This chapter includes the background, problem statement, research objectives, 
investigative questions, research focus, methodology, assumptions / limitations and 
research implications.  
 
 
Background 
 
 
 Beyond any question the most remarkable global developments of the end of the 
20th Century and the beginning of the 21st Century were: the ending of the Cold War 
which resulted in the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and 
the Warsaw Treaty and the 9/11 attacks, that initiated the beginning of the “Global War 
on Terrorism” (GWOT). The necessities of the new era mandated every country to 
allocate their resources relative to the new war concepts that are evolved from the 
previous ones. Under these circumstances, PBL is defined as: “Department of Defense 
(DoD)’s preferred product support approach.” (DoD Directive 5000.1, 2003) Basically, 
PBL may be defined as buying the performance instead of buying the materials (Mahon, 
2007). It may seem an easy explanation but has created a lot of confusion in the minds of 
many acquisition professionals from both the Government’s side and the contractors’ 
side. First of all, PBL was born under the highly elastic conditions described above, 
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which means it must be highly elastic also. That’s why the vision of PBL can be 
translated as answering intensively-elastic needs of the war fighter instantly with a 
reasonable cost for the nation.  So there’s no magic template for implementing a PBL 
program and every program is unique according to the defined needs of the war fighter. If 
there’s no template, how should it be implemented correctly? How can anybody be sure 
about earning the best results via using PBL? At what extent can we trust a contractor and 
give him authority over our weapon system? Although the Government has implemented 
a series of publications to clarify the confusions mentioned above since the first 
introduction of the PBL, there’s still some gaps that are creating difficulties for the 
stakeholders of the PBL programs. 
Besides the Government officials, the academics also contributed to the efforts of 
defining the best way to implement PBL programs, meanwhile putting together the 
lessons learned from the previous experiences and offering some general solutions to the 
problems that occurred then. However, it is very constrained for the academics to do their 
research comprehensively because of some difficulties such as: reaching the real data of 
the PBL programs, differences of the military system from the commercial system, 
diversity of the PBL programs and the privacy necessities of the contractors in order to 
keep their competitive advantages in the market. According to a study, seven key barriers 
and seven enablers are defined as depicted in Table 1 (Devries, 2004). 
While there’s an increased effort to implement PBL for the Government’s product 
support, it hasn’t been achieved yet. According to the latest report of the Government 
Accountability Office (US GAO) depending on a research that compares the decision-
making via using performance measures between 1997 and 2007  
 4 
However, despite having more performance measures available, federal 
managers’ reported use of performance information in management decision-
making has not changed significantly.  (US GAO July 2008, Highlights)    
 
 
 
Table 1. The Barriers and the Enablers of PBL Implementation  
(Adapted from Devries, 2004) 
BARRIERS OF PBL 
IMPLEMENTATION 
ENABLERS OF PBL 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Funding restrictions /inflexibility 
(e.g., Working Capital Fund, various 
appropriations 
/transfer and expiring funds rules, limited 
Program Manager [PM] 
 
Supply Chain Management 
(e.g., end-to-end customer support, enterprise 
integration). 
 
Statutory /regulatory requirements 
(e.g., Title 10, service policies). 
Strategic alliances /partnerships 
(e.g., depot partnering, joint ventures) 
Old paradigms /culture 
(e.g., organic versus commercial, parts 
management versus 
performance management, minimize 
contractors on the battlefield). 
 
Performance- based contracting 
(e.g., incentivizing performance) 
Existing infrastructure /bureaucracy (e.g., PM 
office structure, stovepiping, short PM tours). 
 
Performance-based metrics 
Technical data Rights  issues. 
 
Total Life Cycle Systems Management 
(TLCSM) perspective 
Lack of  PBL awareness /training 
Adoption of Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
(COTS) 
/Best Commercial Practices 
Inability to incentivize organic providers. 
 
Reduction in Total Ownership Cost (RTOC) 
initiative 
 
 
 
Problem Statement 
 
 
 According to the research findings of Devries (2004) performance metrics play 
the most important role in the process of PBL implementation (See Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. The Enablers of PBL implementation  
(Gathered from Devries, 2004) 
 
 
 
 This research, which depends on both the published literature and face- to-face 
meetings with the experts, also supported that there are many issues from defining the 
metrics to evaluation of them in the PBL implementation process.  
 By definition, PBL aims at reaching the desired outcomes via the capabilities of 
contractors without mandating how to achieve those goals. Basically, the desired 
outcomes and the relevant metrics should be defined by the customer for the first step. 
Then, an agreement with the contractor should be achieved with the contractor. 
Next, the data of the defined metrics should be collected. Finally, the collected data of 
assessed values of the metrics should be evaluated. Otherwise, the performance of the 
system may not be monitored and managed in a healthy manner.  
 Therefore, an acceptable, general and easy-to-understand approach which may be 
used to evaluate the defined metrics in order to monitor the system is investigated in this 
study.       
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Research Objectives 
 
 
 First of all, the basic aim of any system is achieving some targeted goals. For this 
reason, the metrics should be defined according to the targeted goals, data must be 
collected and a systematic and reasonable approach should be chosen in order to evaluate 
the system. Without a doubt, PBL-supported systems are not exempted from these 
fundamental processes. There may not be a template to implement the PBL contracts, so 
a common systematic approach should be built. 
 In conclusion, in this study a reasonable model for evaluation of the defined 
metrics to monitor the system is proposed to make healthy decisions. As a result, the 
following investigative questions have to be answered. 
 
 
Investigative Questions 
 
 
1) What are the general metrics defined in the contracts?  
 Actually, there’s neither a standard template for PBL contracts, nor standardized 
metrics. However, relevant to their knowledge about PBL, the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) mentioned some useful metrics as: Operational Availability (Ao), 
Operational Reliability (R), Cost per Unit Usage (CUU), Logistics Footprint (LF) and 
Logistics Response Time (LRT) in their published book of “Performance Based 
Logistics: A Program Manager's Product Support Guide”, also known as PBL Guide. 
(DAU, 2005)  
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 However, some academics mentioned that these metrics are high level composite 
metrics (Kumar et al., 2007). So in each PBL contract, some or all of these metrics should 
be tailored according to the desired goals and would be negotiated with the contractor/s. 
2) What is the general current evaluation method of the metrics?  
According to the experts’ opinions, in most of the PBL contracts, the metrics are 
evaluated by a two step process that is: 
a) Collecting assessed values of the metrics within the contractually-defined terms. 
(ex: average monthly values)  
b) Comparing assessed values of the metrics with the contractually targeted numbers 
of each metric individually.1
3) What are the gaps of the current evaluation method? 
   
a) According to the laws of statistics, each one of the pair wise comparisons includes 
risks of making type 1 and type 2 errors, which are the probabilities of making 
misjudgment depending on a statistical comparison. The probability of making a 
mistake in comparisons increases as the number of pairs compared increases. 
b) According to the Theory of Constraints; local improvements do not necessarily 
mean that the whole system improved (Goldratt and Cox, 1992). By monitoring 
each metric individually, we may not visualize the big picture and make healthy 
decisions at a strategic level.  
c) The current evaluation method may be useful in order to understand if the 
assessed values of the individual metrics satisfied the contractual agreements. 
                                                 
1 In addition to these two processes, some experts mentioned that in some cases a process of weighing the parameters and calculating a 
sole number to use for strategic decisions is also used. According to our research, we will mention this additional step to the current 
evaluation method under the subject heading of “The Issues about the Evaluation Process of the PBL Systems” at the end of 
“Literature Review”.     
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However, as some academics mentioned, there may be conflicts between the 
metrics such as: “some metrics may be over performing while the others are 
underperforming” (Sols et al., 2007).  
d) “The scarcest resource in an organization is a manager’s time.” (Kaplan and 
Cooper,. 1997, p.144) The evaluation of the metrics individually may consume 
more time than necessary especially for the senior executives for two reasons. 
First, there may be an excessive amount of defined parameters and the decision 
maker may need time to understand the impact of each one of them on the system.  
Second, there may be conflicts between parameters. Although the decision maker 
may spend much time and effort, s/he may not use the performance data 
appropriately in the decision-making process. (US GAO July 2008, Highlights)         
 Furthermore; the core investigative questions that will shape and guide this study 
are determined as; 
4) How should the metrics be evaluated to improve decision making? 
5) What should be the core objectives of an evaluation model? 
6) Can the proposed model in this thesis be used for forecasting, or building new PBL 
contracts? 
7) At which decision level may the proposed model be used? 
 
 These questions will be answered at Chapter V according to the results gathered 
throughout this study. 
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Research Focus 
 
 
 The reviewed literature and the knowledge gathered from the experts suggest that 
PBL may be divided into three parts in a time scale (See Figure 2). This research is 
focused on the post- contract period.  Second, an alternative approach to monitor the 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) supported systems both at the individual metrics 
level and at the system level is sought, so the evaluation processes and approaches are 
concentrated on.  Finally, a model is built in order to fulfill the aim of proposing an 
alternative approach in this area. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The time scale of PBL applications 
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
 First of all, the PBL concept was studied according to the published literature and 
experts’ opinions. Second, gaps in the PBL literature were defined in order to make a 
contribution in one of those directions. Third, the investigative questions were created. 
Then the data were collected, according to the scope of this study. Next, the laws of 
statistics, calculus and geometry were used to process the gathered data and built an 
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integrated model to evaluate the success of PBL contracts.  Finally, the published 
literature and/or the experts’ opinions were referenced in order to validate the model.  
 
 
Assumptions / Limitations 
 
 
 First of all, the research is concerned with the post- contract period; thus, all the 
parameters were defined, negotiated and agreed to by the relevant sides.  
 Second, all the performance standards relating to the metrics (both qualitative and 
quantitative) were mandated with the time frames in the contract, such as: 80 % of 
availability at the end of every operation day, reduction of logistic footprint at the end of 
every 3 months, or 85 % user satisfaction at the end of every month.     
 Third, all the assessed numbers of the metrics must satisfy the targeted contractual 
numbers or in other words the bottom-line constraints individually for each time period. 
If not than the overall performance of the contractor must satisfy the overall contractual 
requirement for the next term.   
 
 
Organization of the Thesis 
 
 
 This thesis consists of five chapters. In Chapter I, first the basic problem was 
defined along with the background and the problem statement. Second, the research 
objectives were set and the investigative questions created. Third, the research focus was 
designated. Then, the methodology was explained with the relevant assumptions / 
limitations, and, finally, with the organization of the thesis, the map of the thesis was 
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revealed. The following Chapters both extend and offer a more detailed study about the 
research.  
 Chapter II presents a Literature Review about the PBL concept, including its 
birth, evolution and the current gaps of the literature. Chapter III describes the research 
methodology of this thesis, while introducing a new mathematical model about the 
evaluation of the metrics. Chapter IV presents the results and checks applicability and the 
usefulness of the proposed evaluation process model. 
 Finally, Chapter V presents the findings and recommendations, as well as 
concluding the thesis and suggesting future studies to extend the research.   
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II. Literature Review 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 In any kind of war, the participation and cooperation of the whole nation is the 
most important aspect of success. The reliance on contractors increased over time and the 
ratio of the number of contractors over the number of troops was nearly 1:10 in the Gulf 
War and dramatically increased to 4:3 in the Balkans between 1995 and 2000  (Vernon, 
2003). Most of the times, the contractors seemed to operate as a support unit, generally in 
the logistics area, for the armed forces. Although these are not the clear borders in a time 
scale, military logistics can be separated into three eras for the United States (US).2
The Transition Logistics Era is the overlapping part which started since the end of 
the Cold War. Supply Chain Management (SCM), Sense and Respond Logistics 
(S&RL)
  
The Traditional Logistics Era continued its evolution from the foundation of the 
US to the end of the Cold War. The traditional logistics concepts yield predictive, 
optimized, linear supply chains that operated in hierarchical command and control 
structures (Griffin, 2008). 
3, Performance Based Logistics (PBL)4 and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)5
                                                 
2 The separation of logistics into three areas for the US is constructed by the researcher of this study. 
3 The S&RL framework exploits advanced technologies through highly adaptive, self-synchronizing functional processes designed to 
drive shorter decision cycles and faster responses.  
4 PBL is the core of this study and will be defined clearly in the next chapters.  
5 The ERP systems and networks are being applied to DoD logistics in an effort to create a connected environmentin which near real-
time data can be exchanged and response time shortened. 
 
systems and networks are introduced in the Department of Defense (DoD). New ways of 
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thinking such as: Total Quality Management (TQM), Lean, the Balanced Score Card 
(BSC), Activity Based Costing (ABC) have been introduced. 
The Integrated Logistics Era is the future goal of DoD.  This era defines a highly 
competitive environment between the contractors and a highly collaborative environment 
between the contractors and the Government. The main expectation is answering the 
intensively-elastic needs of the war fighter instantly with a reasonable cost for the nation.  
 
 
The History of PBL 
 
 
First of all, it may be proposed that the PBL concept is related to the level of the 
technology in the system. The US The Government’s first aircraft contract with the 
Wright brothers in 1909 may be a good example for this proposal as depicted in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. The First PBL application of DoD  
(Gathered from DAU, 2008) 
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The idea behind PBL is that if the contractors could produce a highly 
technological product or service, then they should know how to improve it by means of 
reliability and cost aspects. So limiting them by mandating how to produce their product 
or service under non-PBL contracts may result in losing an opportunity of benefitting 
from their innovative approaches and cumulated experience (Rievley, 2001). 
After the Cold War period, an urgent need for change occurred in every aspect of 
the armed forces. This urgency forced the DoD to transform their approach. First of all, a 
main cause of the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was the 
misallocation of their resources and inefficiencies of their system. Although there was 
one enemy, it was spread out geographically, making it hard for the USSR to carry the 
heavy burden of logistics support for its system. History clarifies that, using a large 
conventional army makes war very expensive and requires a large support system to 
maintain effectiveness. By observing the enemy well, the US has taken the necessary 
precautions since 1987.  The Depot Maintenance seemed to be a good area to start, 
because it is the key to the total DoD logistics process that supports millions of 
equipment items, including 52,000 combat vehicles, 350 ships and 17,000 aircraft 
(Griffin, 2008). For the US DoD, it’s estimated that; 80% of the budget is used for 
sustaining the defense systems. (Sols et al., 2007)  As it is mentioned in the Government 
Accountability Office (US GAO) report in 2001, the DoD defined three series of actions 
primarily to shape the depot Maintenance environment. The actions taken and the results 
that have been achieved since 2001 are described below.  
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1) The base realignment and closure (BRAC) process, which was designed to reduce 
DOD’s infrastructure; has reduced DOD’s cold-war--oriented infrastructure from 38 
military depots to 19 (See Figure 4). 
2) The increased reliance on the private sector for depot maintenance support resulted in 
the contractors’ share of depot maintenance funding increasing by 90 percent while 
the military depots’ share of funding has declined by 6 percent (See Table 2).   
3) The major downsizing of depot maintenance personnel amounted to 59 percent, 
which was the third highest percent of any category of DOD civilian personnel (US 
GAO, March 2001, p.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Key Events Influencing the Reshaping of the Military Depot System  
(Gathered from US GAO, March 2001) 
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Table 2. Public and Private Sector Change in Depot Maintenance Funds  
(Gathered from US GAO, March 2001) 
Sector Fiscal year 
1987 
(dollars in billions) 
 
Fiscal year 
2000 
(dollars in billions) 
Change in 
dollar amount 
(dollars in billions) 
Percent change 
Public $ 8.7 $ 8.2 $- .5 -6% 
Private $ 4.0 $ 7.6 $+ 3.6 +90% 
Total $12.7 $15.8 +$3.1 +24% 
 
 
 
By the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the US was faced with a 
very difficult situation of shifting from traditional army warfare to asymmetric warfare. 
Actually, the concept of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) defined by the US is 
harder than what the USSR experienced in the Cold War.  Briefly, there’s no enemy 
country but there’s an enemy, there are no borders of the conflict zone, but everywhere is 
potentially a conflict zone and showing a presence of big conventional armed forces in an 
area is no more a show of superiority, but becoming a bigger target for the shadow 
enemy. “The new threats are broader and include global, regional and local elements. 
International organizations, allied nation states, rogue nations, hostile states and terrorist 
groups all contend within this environment”  (Griffin, 2008). 
Dealing with terror is similar with the children’s Marco Polo game. It gets the 
signals of the presence of the targets. The prevented visibility and increased mobility of 
the targets makes the efforts to reach them meaningless unless any of the targets are 
caught at the very first moment with a reasonable amount of effort. The aim of the targets 
is taking as much energy as possible to make the enemy exhausted. As seen from a very 
simple child game, allocation of resources and/or directing the opponent to misallocate its 
resources is the key to success for everyone.  
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The budget dynamics of the terrorist organizations are much different than the 
Governments, which make them more resilient and harder to deal with. An example can 
be given of one income item, the drug trafficking, for a terrorist organization that the US 
deals with. According to the recently published two reports of the United Nations (UN), 
92% of the global opium production is at the southern regions of Afghanistan in the year 
2006. This raw material for heroin soared in 2007, rising 34 percent from the already 
record levels of 2006, under the control of the Taliban insurgency (UN DRUG REPORT, 
2007; UN DRUG REPORT, 2008).  
Not only the production, but also the transportation and the distribution activities 
are governed by a network of terrorist organizations. In 2007, Afghanistan either 
processed and exported or stored for future export some 660 tons of heroin and morphine. 
Because of the risks associated with smuggling, opium gains value at every border it 
crosses. By the time heroin reaches its final destination, its price may have gone up 100 
times and the reports found indications that the Taliban may have started to use drug 
profits to purchase arms, pay militia forces and finance logistics (UN DRUG REPORT, 
2008). 
Because of some reasons explained above, GWOT most recently referred to as the 
long war, has stimulated all US federal agencies to review their ongoing operations and 
budget to concentrate on cost savings. 
However, concentrating on cost savings without understanding the demanding 
nature of asymmetric warfare includes a big risk. According to the Mid- Session Review 
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of the US Budget6
Just 3 weeks after 9/11, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review
 2009, the President is mentioned as “committed to restrain Federal 
spending for the purpose of balancing the budget by 2012” (EOP US Mid-Session 
Report, July 2008, p 3).  However, in the same document, the 2008 Supplemental 
Appropriations Act is mentioned. According to that act, U.S. troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan will be provided with the resources they need to fight the Global War on 
Terror and the cost savings are targeted on non-security discretionary spending. The 
objectives are mentioned as;  
elimination or reducement of 151 unnecessary or duplicative programs totaling 
$18 billion and holding the growth in non-security spending to below one percent 
for 2009 (EOP US Mid-Session Report, July 2008, p 3).  
 
In addition to the President’s targets, the cost saving opportunities via the 
improvements of Supply Chain Management (SCM) activities may also be mentioned. 
According to the revised budget of the US for fiscal year 2009, the share of the total 
Defense sector is requested as $515.4 billion and the requested DoD Budget is $17.647 
billion. (EOP US Mid-Session Report, July 2008, p 23)  Assuming a very conservative 
target of 1% of cost savings via improvements in SCM activities throughout the Defense 
sector, this would create an extra resource of $5.154 billion.  
7
                                                 
6 The Mid-Session Review is the supplemental updated form of the US budget by the President. It contains revised estimates of 
receipts, outlays, budget authority and the budget deficit or the surplus for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. 
7 QDRs are conducted every four years to ascertain what the military will need in manpower and materiel to address anticipated 
missions envisioned 20 years in the future.  
 
 (OSD QDR) was 
published and compressing the supply chain via modernizing business processes and 
using Performance Base Logistics (PBL) are mentioned as logistics transformations 
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initiatives in the report (Mahon, 2007).  Basically, the OSD QDR was declaring the 
fundamentals of the new era of logistics as:  
 
To ensure the Department transforms its logistics capabilities, DoD will pursue 
actions to sustain the force more effectively and efficiently. Specific areas will 
include a dramatically improved deployment process and accelerated 
implementation of logistics decision support tools. DoD must also accelerate 
logistics enterprise integration, reduce logistics demand and reduce the cost of 
logistics. In addition, conducting industrial vulnerability assessments and 
developing sustainment plans for the most critical weapons systems and preferred 
munitions will help ensure effective sustainment.  (OSD QDR, 2001, p 35) 
 
 In addition, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff mentioned the need of an 
integrated system in his statement by: 
If truly dramatic improvement in future joint operational effectiveness is to be 
achieved, however, more is required. First, a DOD-wide transformation strategy, a 
joint organizing vision and a joint transformation roadmap are essential to guide, 
integrate and synchronize the efforts of the Services. Second, we need DOD-wide 
reform of key institutional planning, programming, budgeting and acquisition 
processes. These two requirements are interdependent; no real progress will be 
made in one without the other.  (OSD QDR, 2001, p.68) 
 
Meanwhile it was projected for 2001 that protecting and advancing US interests 
around the world involve over $1 trillion in assets, about 3 million military and civilian 
employees and about an annual budget of $310 billion then (US GAO., January 2001, p 
6).  
In 2002, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (USD AT&L) mandated the services to develop and implement a schedule to 
aggressively apply Performance Based Logistics (PBL) to all new weapons systems, as 
well as all Acquisition Category (ACAT) I and II legacy systems before May 1, 2002 
(Mahon, 2007).  
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In 2003 the DoD Directive 5000.1 which is also known as the Defense 
Acquisition System (DAS) was implemented and performance-based strategies for 
procurement and sustainment of the products and services were mentioned as “to do 
whenever feasible” (DoD Directive 5000.1, 2003, p 9). 
 In addition to that, “The Primary Objective of Defense Acquisition” is defined as:  
to acquire quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements 
to mission capability and operational support, in a timely manner and at a fair and 
reasonable price.  (DoD Directive 5000.1, 2003, p 6) 
 
Although implementation of PBL was pointed as a target, it was not described to 
Program Managers (PMs) how to implement it. The ambiguity of the changeover period 
and the unanswered questions in the minds of acquisition professionals cumulatively 
increased. Then the USD AT&L tried to eliminate the confusion by two publications in 
2003. The first one was listing key activities and outputs which PMs should consider 
when assessing a program for a PBL strategy and the second one was the targets for the 
percentage of contract dollars awarded using performance-based service activities8
                                                 
8 The targets were set as:  % 25 for Fiscal Year (FY) 2003, % 35 for FY 2004, % 50 for FY 2005. 
 
(Mahon, 2007). The Office of Secretary of the Defense (OSD) joined the description 
process by publishing the Designing and Assessing Supportability in DoD Weapons 
Systems: A Guide to Increased Reliability and Reduced Logistics Footprint which is also 
referred to as the Supportability Guide (SG) in October 2003. The SG tried to address and 
explain the responsibilities of PMs in the Total Life Cycle Systems Management 
(TLCSM) concept, which is briefly the responsibility for a system from cradle to grave 
(OSD, 2003). The SG filled up a big gap about the implementation of PBL in addition to 
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DoD Directive 5000.1, 2003, the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) and DoD 
Instruction 5000.2, the Operation of the DAS.  In the SG the necessity of integration of 
performance and the other elements of effectiveness is mentioned as: 
Performance cannot be considered separate from the other elements of operational 
effectiveness – they are inextricably linked. The system capabilities and functions 
represent the desired mission capabilities as a total package, together with the 
sustainment objectives and the desired logistics footprint reductions. As discussed 
in the following paragraph, in the current operational and budgetary context, 
priorities must be complemented with an emphasis on system availability -- 
Reliability, Maintainability, Supportability (RMS) and producibility  (OSD ,2003, 
p 11). 
  
Meanwhile new issues arose concerned with the PBL implementations of PMs 
and the office of the USD AT&L continued their publications in January 2004 and March 
2004. This continuation of policy and guidance releases suggests that a major 
transformation in product support may have been prematurely implemented by DoD 
(Mahon, 2007)    
Finally, the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) explained the DoD policy in 
their publications; “Performance Based Logistics: A Program Manager's Product Support 
Guide”, which is also referred as the PBL Guide9
PMs optimize performance and cost objectives by the implementation of PBL in 
varying degrees of The Government-industry partnerships as depicted in Figure 5. 
, on March 2005 (DAU, 2005). 
According to that publication:  
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is the purchase of support as an integrated, 
affordable, performance package designed to optimize system readiness and meet 
performance goals for a weapons system through long-term support arrangements 
with clear lines of authority and responsibility. Simply put, performance based 
strategies buy outcomes, not products or services (DAU, 2005, p 1-1). 
 
                                                 
9 The DAU’s publication “Performance Based Logistics: A Program Manager's Product Support Guide” on March 2005 was referred 
to as the PBL Guide in the literature then.  
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Figure 5. The Government-industry partnerships  
(Gathered from DAU, 2008) 
 
 
 
Before explaining the implementation of PBL, it would be useful to mention some 
key components of PBL which are: the Integrated Product Teams, PBL metrics, 
Performance Based Agreements and Business Cases Analyses 
 
 
Integrated Product Teams 
 
 
PBL Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) which are also referred to as the main 
stakeholders of implemented PBL programs, are war fighters, users, developers, 
acquirers, technologists, testers, budgeters and sustainers experts and war fighter 
representatives(DoDD 5000.1, 2003, para. E1.1.2.).  A sample PBL IPT team depicted in 
Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 7: Spectrum of PBL Strategies (Adapted from DAU, 2008) 
 
Figure 8: The Spectrum of PBL  (Gathered from the DAU web cite, July 2008)   
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Figure 6. A Sample PBL IPT  
(Gathered from DAU, 2005) 
 
 
 
This team should work together from the beginning of the program and it is 
essential for the success of any program that members are able to work across 
organizational boundaries. 
 
 
PBL Metrics  
 
 
An effective PBL implementation depends on metrics that accurately reflect the 
user’s needs and can be effective measures of the support provider’s performance.  The 
PBL Top-Level Metrics are defined in the DAU (2005) as:  
1) “Operational Availability (Ao) is the percent of time that a system is available for a 
mission or the ability to sustain operations tempo” (DAU, 2005, p. 2-5). 
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2) “Operational Reliability (R) is the measure of a system in meeting mission success 
objectives (percent of objectives met, by system)” (DAU, 2005, p. 2-5). 
3) Cost per Unit Usage (CUU) is the total operating cost divided by the appropriate unit 
of measurement for a given system” (DAU, 2005, p. 2-5).  
4) Logistics Footprint (LF) is the Government/contractor size or “presence” of deployed 
logistics support required to deploy, sustain and move a system. Measurable elements 
include inventory/equipment, personnel, facilities, transportation assets and real 
estate” (DAU, 2005, p. 2-5). 
5) Logistics Response Time (LRT) is the period of time from logistics demand signal 
sent to satisfaction of that logistics demand. “Logistics demand” refers to systems, 
components, or resources (including labor) required for system logistics support” 
(DAU, 2005, p. 2-6).   
However, these five metrics defined by the PBL Guide may not be appropriate to 
use raw for every PBL contract. First of all, these metrics are general and composite, for 
example:  Operational Availability (Ao), may be defined as the ratio of mean time 
between maintenance (MTBM)10
                                                 
10 According to our literature review, Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) is also used instead of MTBM.  
 to total system time (Kumar et al., 2007).  
Thus, each program should consider and tailor some or all of these metrics, as 
well as define new metrics for their program. Ledyard and Vitasek (2004) offered five 
rules that may be used for the measurement process as depicted in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Five Rules Approach for Good Measurement  
(Gathered from Ledyard and Vitasek, 2004) 
 
 
 
Performance Based Agreements and Business Case Analyses 
 
 
Before discussing Performance Based Logistics (PBL) implementation, it is 
important to mention two key PBL implementation issues, which are Performance Based 
Agreements (PBAs) and PBL Business Case Analyses (PBL BCAs).  
PBAs are one of the key components of an effective product support strategy. 
(DoDD 5000.1, 2003, para E1.1.16.) They establish the negotiated baseline of 
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performance and corresponding support necessary to achieve that performance, whether 
provided by commercial or organic support providers.  
According to the PBL Guide BCAs should consider: 
• The relative cost versus benefits of different support strategies 
• The methods and rationale used to quantify benefits and costs 
• The impact and value of performance/cost/schedule/sustainment trade-offs 
• Data required to support and justify the PBL strategy 
• Sensitivity of the data to change 
• Analysis and classification of risks 
• A recommendation and summary of the implementation plan for proceeding 
with the best value alternative  (DAU, 2005, p 3-28). 
 
 
Implementation of PBL 
 
 
The PBL implementation process is flexible and PBLs differ in scale, covering a 
broad range from component level up to system platform level. On one hand, DAU 
academics proposed in the PBL Guide, that the 12-step process to implement a PBL 
program into consideration be tailored appropriately to the level of the system. (See 
Figure 8) 
 
 
 
Figure 8. PBL Implementation steps  
(Gathered from DAU, 2005) 
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On the other hand Berkowitz et al. (2005) offered six guidelines briefly explained 
below:  
1) “Assign responsibilities clearly throughout the firm— Blanket statements about 
policy changes that imply that ‘PBL is everyone’s responsibility’ are typically 
ineffective” (Berkowitz et al., 2005, pp 263-264). 
2) “Design metrics to motivate the right behavior— Metrics designed to motivate the 
right behavior must be carefully crafted and applicable across the entire organization” 
(Berkowitz et al., 2005, pp 263-264). 
3)  “Manage failures to limit disincentives for risk-taking— Failure is part of the 
learning process” (Berkowitz et al., 2005, pp 263-264). 
4)  “Develop a supportive organizational context for tools— These tools include 
middleware to standardize decision-making based on legacy system output and 
tracking systems to document performance improvements and lessons learned across 
the organization”  (Berkowitz et al., 2005, pp 263-264). 
5) “Manage relationships with stakeholders— Continuing communication with 
stakeholders is one way to gain their support” (Berkowitz et al., 2005, pp 263-264). 
6)  “Benchmark to promote continuous improvement— In order to find how well 
initiatives are working, compare results through the benchmarking process 
(Berkowitz et al., 2005, pp 263-264). 
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Risk vs. Contract Types in PBL  
 
 
Buying performance instead of materials and/or services includes risk implications 
both for the contractor and the Government. Sols et al. (2007) proposed a reasonable 
relationship between risk and contract types as depicted in Figure 9.  
General contract types of PBL mentioned in Sols et al. (2007) are described in the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) as: 
1) “Firm Fixed Price (FFP): A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not 
subject to any adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in 
performing the contract”  (GSA, 2005, p 16.2-1). 
2) “Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF): A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is a cost reimbursement 
contract that provides for payment to the contractor of a negotiated fee that is fixed at 
the inception of the contract” (GSA, 2005, p 16.3-1). 
3) “Fixed Price Incentive (FPI): A fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract specifies a 
target cost, a target profit, a price ceiling (but not a profit ceiling or floor) and a profit 
adjustment formula” (GSA, 2005, p 16.4-2). 
4) “Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF): The cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-
reimbursement contract that provides for the initially negotiated fee to be adjusted 
later by a formula based on the relationship of total allowable costs to total target 
costs”  (GSA, 2005, p 16.4-3).   
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Figure 9. Contract Types vs Risk  
(Gathered from Sols et al., 2007) 
 
 
 
The Gaps in the PBL Literature  
 
 
 PBL is a relatively new concept and there are still some important issues that 
should be addressed. According to the reviewed literature, the main issues about PBL 
may be grouped under three main headings which are: the Ethical Issues of Reliance of 
Contractors in Battlefields, the Issues about Contract Length, and the Measurement 
Issues of the PBL Systems.  
 
 
The Ethical Issues of Reliance of Contractors in the Battlefield 
 
Openshaw (2006) addressed some important ethical issues related to contractor 
reliance in his study. Briefly, the contractors are not military members, so basically do 
not have the same status as a military soldier. Under the international agreements 
between the Governments, military members are mentioned; however the contractors are 
exempted in many cases. Because of this reason, in the chaotic atmosphere of the conflict 
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zones, actions and the contingencies related with the actions of the contractors may cause 
more damage than the benefit for the Governments. For a worst case scenario, contractors 
may resign at any time and leave the combat zone, which would paralyze the capability 
of the troops almost immediately (Openshaw, 2006). 
Issues about Contract Length 
 
  Generally, PBL contracts create a necessity for contractors to make upfront 
investments. That’s why longer contract terms allow contractors to spread the investment 
costs over a larger base and this may create a long-term relationship between the 
Government and the contractor (Griffin, 2008).  On the other hand, this approach 
includes some risks for the Government. Gardner (2008) defines some of the potential 
risks as: “supplier opportunism, selection of the wrong supplier, supplier volume 
uncertainty, foregoing to other businesses of suppliers and unreasonableness of buyers” 
(Gardner, 2008).  
Measurement Issues of the PBL Systems 
 
The PBL concept was created to achieve a higher level of outcome by using the 
capabilities of the contractors such as business experience, innovation and technical 
background (Rievley, 2001).  However, before giving a complete authority to the 
contractor (supplier) about how they would do something, the Government (customer) 
should be sure of what it would get. Thus, the desired outcomes would be defined and 
then appropriate performance metrics would be developed for being sure of the desired 
outcomes. However, there are gaps between the war fighter -oriented The Government 
metrics and the profit -oriented contractor metrics and how the services provided by the 
contractors would be measured by means of The Government objectives. For example, 
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reducing the logistics foot-print (LFP) may be a desired outcome for the Government, but 
it is hard to translate, quantify and measure. The contractors may not perceive it the same 
way as the Government and higher transaction costs could be the result (Doerr et al., 
2005).        
According to some academics, the PM’s approach should be pragmatic while 
establishing the metrics (Ledyard and Vitasek 2004). However, some earlier academics 
called attention to the trap of “if you can’t measure what you want, want what you can 
measure” (Kaplan and Cooper, 1996, p 100). Instead, they insisted on searching new 
approaches in order to develop new metrics and new measurement approaches to achieve 
the desired outcomes (Kaplan and Cooper, 1996, p 100) .The National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) Headquarters Performance Based Contracting Assessment 
of 1999 confirms this by mentioning the difficulties in developing appropriate and 
meaningful performance standards for advanced Research and Development (R&D) 
activities (Rievley, 2001).  Besides, this doesn’t mean that they should give up searching 
to develop new metrics and demanding performance outcomes that are vitally important 
for critical mission accomplishments. 
Generally achieving the desired levels of reliability and availability at a 
reasonable cost is a common expectation from the contractor (Smith, 2004). But this 
expectation covers a wide range. Three main measurement issues related with PBL 
within the scope of this research are:  
1) Defining desired levels of performance: Kaplan and Norton (1996) offered an 
integrated approach from defining the mission of the company to constructing an 
entire organization around that mission statement in the Balanced Score Card (BSC). 
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Basically, the aim of the BSC is deriving the mission of the company and achieving 
the strategy that would lead the company to reach that goal and then deriving the 
strategy in order to build relevant metrics that would translate “the mission and 
strategy into action” (Kaplan and Cooper, 1996). They defined four sets of 
performance metrics perspectives that are: financial, customers, internal business 
processes and learning and growth (Kaplan and Cooper, 1996). Three important 
aspects of the BSC for the current study are: 
a) The performance metrics are mentioned and developed according to the defined 
mission and strategy by four main dimensions and many sub-dimensions. 
b) All the defined metrics should have cause and effect relationships by means of 
whether or not serving to the strategy. These cause and effect relationships define 
the hypothesized correlations among the metrics.     
c) “Causal paths that form all the measures on a score card should be linked to 
financial objectives” (Kaplan and Cooper, 1996, p 151). On the Government side 
financial measures are cost savings and budget constraints.  
Two important issues of the BSC are relevant to the current study. First, their 
opening argument in the BSC criticizes the usage of a single metric in order to 
monitor the system via an airplane-pilot example that mentions the existence of many 
different flight instruments (Kaplan and Cooper, 1996, pp 1-2).  Although accepting 
this idea, we also may call attention to the cockpit windows, or canopies of the 
aircrafts in addition to many other instruments. By the existence of the windows, the 
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pilot can evaluate the current overall position of the aircraft in a short time frame and 
then may check the relevant instruments in order to take the necessary steps.  
Second, linking of all the measures to the financial outcomes in BSC may be 
appropriate for commercial organizations; however, financial outcomes may not be 
the only desired outcomes in PBL-governed weapon systems for the Government. In 
other words, the desired outcomes for the Government may include some additional 
areas and the metrics that are related to different specific areas may conflict with each 
other. Therefore, a higher level sight may be needed to govern the system. 
 In conclusion, the BSC is a necessary mindset while building the metrics and the 
measurement and/or management system. Although constructing a BSC takes time 
and effort, a strategic-level BSC should be built for the organization and the relevant 
metrics should be set before starting to negotiate the PBL contract for a weapon 
system.       
2) Cost Management: Achievable cost reductions are expected from PBL-governed 
systems and Business Case Analyses (BCAs)11
                                                 
11 See pp 21-22 in this study for a more detailed description of BCAs.  
 are very important in the PBL 
implementation process. However, in some situations, cost data neither exists nor is 
accurately allocated (Rievley, 2001; US GAO, 2005, p 7; Mahon, 2007). According 
to the reviewed literature, Activity Based Costing (ABC) may be the right choice for 
PBL-governed systems. In addition to that, Traditional Cost Accounting (TCA) 
systems are not appropriate, but mandated because of financial reporting purposes: 
especially for tax issues for the commercial companies (Kaplan and Cooper, 1997, p 
13).  The Government also relies on TCA systems for funding and spending issues.  
 34 
Activity Based Costing (ABC) is an approach especially for the service industries 
in order to link the costs of the resources they supply to the outcomes gathered by the 
service provided (Kaplan and Cooper, 1997, p 228). The most important aspects of 
ABC related with the current study may be mentioned as:  
a) It is an integrated approach similar to the BSC, which concentrates on linking the 
cost of supplies used with the outcomes gathered. Allocating the costs according 
to the cause and effect relationships among the different levels of the system 
makes ABC potentially more accurate than TCA systems.    
b) Parallel to the usage of ABC systems, accurate cost data may be gathered in order 
to build a BCA. 
c) Some important cost metrics may be developed via the usage of ABC.       
Evaluation Processes of PBL 
 
Each system has some inputs and some outcomes. The objective of the PBL is 
minimizing the committed resources (inputs) while maximizing the achieved levels of 
performance outcomes and the mission of the evaluation processes is to ensure that the 
system is serving the objective. Generally problems occur because of either the 
inappropriately mandated performance goals, or misunderstood metrics (Sols et al., 
2007).  
Kumar et al (2007) offered an optimization model to both The Government and 
the contractor sides. In their study, it’s proposed that the contractors would optimize 
multiple performance measures of their product by choosing the optimum sub-units at the 
design level and the Government officials would choose the best design between 
competing firms via the usage of their model (Kumar et al., 2007). Despite being out of 
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the scope of the current study12, it is important to mention some gaps of their model. 
First, the model is a descriptive one and some elements such as annual failure rate of the 
parts, stock levels of parts, annual repair rates are assumed to be known between 
alternatives before the design stage. However, these elements may only be estimated with 
related variances in the best case. Second, the logistics footprint is defined as a decision 
parameter for their model, even though it was not explained how it was calculated as a 
sole number13
The common sense in implementing a PBL contract is to incentivize the contractor to 
achieve the desired levels of performance. Some academics suggested defining dead 
(neither penalty nor reward), penalty and bonus zones for each one of the figures of 
merits (FOMs)
. Third, as they mentioned in their study, the increase of the number of 
components and the subsystems would make it impossible to solve with an exact 
algorithm. 
14
                                                 
12 The optimization model mentioned in the study of Kumar et al., (2007), is mainly concerned with the Pre- PBL period.  
(See Figure 3) 
13The Logistic Footprint includes inventory/equipment, personnel, facilities, transportation assets and real estate by definition, 
assuming it as a sole number without showing how it was calculated in a model may be an over assumption. 
14 The word Figure of Merit (FOM) is used instead of metrics in Sols et al., (2007) 
, compensation between pairs of metrics, and proposed a multi-
dimensional dead, penalty, and reward zones approach (Sols et al., 2007). These concepts 
are depicted in Figures 10, 11 and 12. 
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Figure 10. Dead, Bonus and Penalty Zones Concept  
(Gathered from Sols et al., 2007) 
 
 
Figure 11. 3-Dimensional Dead, Penalty and Reward Zones  
(Gathered from Sols et al., 2007) 
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Figure 12. 3-Dimensional Dead, Penalty and Reward Zones15
The multi-dimensional dead (neither penalty nor reward), penalty and reward 
zones approach includes some important aspects for the current study. First, the idea of 
linking two metrics in a 3-dimensional shape and defining 9 possible zones for the two 
metrics reveals the difficulty of integrating metrics in a model. Second, each one of the 
metrics is defined with a variance, so the model is prescriptive. Third, compensation 
between pairs of metrics is introduced. This idea with the usage of weighted average 
evaluation considers inter-relationships between the metrics. There are some issues with 
this approach. First, a requirement of (n+1) dimensional space is mentioned for (n) 
number of different metrics as depicted in Figure 11. For each pair of metrics, there 
would be 9 different possibilities, as depicted in Figure 12 as dead, penalty and reward 
zones. However, in this model, only two metrics’ axes were presented with the reward 
axis in order to define the zones within. So basically, as the authors point out, using the 
   
(Gathered from Sols et al., 2007) 
 
                                                 
15 The word Figure of Merit (FOM) is used instead of metrics, the super-indices L and U denote the lower and the upper thresholds 
(Sols et al., 2007). 
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five key parameters as DAU introduced: availability, reliability, logistics foot print, 
logistics response time and cost per unit usage, would result in a 6-dimensional space. 
This implies 90 different zones16
                                                 
16For 5 parameters; first we need to select 2 from 5 and then we need to define 9 zones for each pair. So the total number of the zones 
would be:  
 with related compensation, penalty and reward 
amounts. As the number of defined metrics increases in a PBL contract, the number of 
zones would disproportionally increase. In addition to being hard to implement, the 
Government should also consider the risk of still paying some amount to the contractor 
because of the existence of some high reward zones. A similar approach is used by some 
academics to suggest possible improvements to the maintenance contracting process 
currently utilized by the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) (Bell 
and Berkland, 2007).  According to the defined 8 key parameters and 44 derived sub-
parameters, they defined a weighted evaluation process with a partial payment method 
that includes incentives.  Although the parameters were defined in a systematic way, the 
evaluation process might not be appropriate.  For example, SCDOT accepted to pay some 
amount of money to the contractor because of satisfying some parameters at certain 
levels; however, the assessed values of the other parameters are evaluated as 
unacceptable and penalties assessed. (See Table 3) 
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Table 3. Evaluation Process of SCDOT  
(Gathered from Bell and Berkland, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
Building the trust and partnerships between parties is an important aspect of PBL; 
however, the Government side must consider the necessary precautions in order to 
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guarantee the desired performance outcomes. One of the most effective tools for the 
Government is using incentives and disincentives.  
Sols et al. (2008) offered an  n-dimensional compensated effectiveness metric 
approach with a reward scheme model, which proposes to calculate a single number as 
the “compensated system effectiveness metric” and build a reward scheme accordingly 
(Sols et al. 2008). Defining a model in which a calculated single metric for the evaluation 
process proposed can be useful. Some issues should be considered. The metrics 
mentioned are composite and multiple tiered with weights assigned at each tier to sub-
components of the effectiveness measure. Normalization for the metrics to fit in [0,1] 
interval permits aggregation. The responsibility to define and calculate the metrics is 
given to the customer; this may include some degree of risk because of the subjectivity. 
In addition, compensating between pairs of metrics is complicated when some are over-
performing and some are under-performing especially if the number of defined metrics 
increases. For example, a real life example of an SCDOT contract which was described 
by Bell and Berkland, (2007), includes 44 sub-metrics; therefore SCDOT could consider 
946 alternatives before implementing the compensation between metrics. 17
Finally, the historical or the predicted value of the calculated system effectiveness 
metric indicated the process for defining the baseline, minimum acceptable and target 
values. Both historical and predicted values may be either very low or infeasible. Instead, 
the upper and the lower limits of the values should be defined by the team of operational 
units, according to their needs for fulfilling the mission. Then the contractors should 
  
                                                 
17 946
2
44
=




C  
 41 
search the feasibility of satisfying those needs with a budget constraint via their expertise 
and innovative approaches. 
 
 
The Core Objectives of an Evaluation Model  
 
 
 The reviewed literature revealed that some models were introduced for the 
evaluation processes in PBL and some of the models are mentioned in the current study. 
According to the cumulated knowledge, the objectives of a model which would be used 
in evaluation processes may be proposed as: 
1) Simplicity : The model must be easy-to-understand and apply by the decision makers.  
2) Reasonability: The assumptions and the results of a model must make sense to the 
decision maker. 
3) Elasticity : A model should be dynamic and can be applied in many kinds of PBL 
contracts. 
4) Precision : The results should be precise to guide the decision maker. 
5) Capability : A model should be capable of processing any number of metrics within 
many time periods. 
6) Integrality : A model should be capable of integrating all metrics and calculate a sole 
metric as the overall performance measure. 
7) Objectivity : The data processing and the outcomes of a model should be the 
same, no matter who performs them. Therefore, the model should be quantitative and 
closed to subjective comments as much as possible.    
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Conclusion 
 
 
First of all, PBL was born from the necessities of the new era of war, just after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks with the implementation of global war on terrorism (GWOT). It 
represents the preferred approach for all procurements by DoD and can be defined as: the 
transformation from acquiring materials to acquiring performance outcomes. Although 
relying on the knowledge and the innovation of the contractor for their product and/or 
service may be reasonable, the benefits of PBL have not been experienced yet, because of 
the ineffective implementation for this long-term support strategy (US GAO, 2005).  
Second, the reviewed literature pointed out three main problem areas of PBL as: 
The Ethical Issues of Reliance of Contractors in the Battlefields, Issues About Contract 
Length, and Measurement Issues of the PBL Systems. Although some studies have been 
done in order to fill the gaps in these areas, there are still some issues especially for the 
evaluation processes and the proposed models. Thus, the current research attempts to 
contribute to the literature by searching for a systematic approach for evaluation of the 
defined metrics via a theoretical integrated model to monitor the system and to make 
healthy decisions about it.   
Finally, the core objectives of a model were suggested as: reasonability, elasticity, 
precision, capability, integrality and objectivity. Achieving these objectives is an aimed 
of the current study.  
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III. Methodology 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 First of all, the PBL concept was studied according to the published literature and 
experts’ opinions. Second, the gaps of the PBL literature were searched and defined in 
order to identify a contribution in one of those directions. This research suggests a 
systematic approach via an integrated model to combine multiple criteria when assessing 
the success of a PBL contract.  
A 4-Step Process Evaluation Model (the 4SPEM) is proposed in this thesis. First 
the current evaluation model (CEM) is built. The CEM is used to check the achieved 
results of individual metrics according to whether or not they are satisfying the 
contractual requirements. Second, a mathematical model (MM) is built. The MM is used 
to calculate the overall performance metric (OPM) for each term. Briefly, the OPM is a 
single, integrated number which represents the overall performance of the system within 
a defined time period (term). Third, the integrated model (IM) is built. The IM is used to 
put together the findings of the CEM and MM and the findings of the IM are analyzed 
and interpreted.  
The defined objectives of the 4SPEM are achieving: reasonability, elasticity, 
precision, capability, integrality and objectivity.The detailed methodology is depicted in 
Figure 13.  
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Figure 13. The Methodology Algorithm of the Thesis 
 
 
 
4-Step Process Evaluation Model (the 4SPEM) 
 
 
 The 4SPEM is designed to suggest an additional insight to decision makers about 
the PBL system that is governed by them. The milestones of the 4SPEM are defined as: 
Building the Current Evaluation Model (CEM), Building the Mathematical Model (MM), 
Building the Integrated Model (IM) and Analysis and Interpretation of the Findings.  
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Step 1: Building the Current Evaluation Model (CEM) 
 
 The CEM is built according to the current evaluation methods which are used by 
the acquisition professionals. Although the literature reviewed so far suggests that there’s 
no template for evaluation of the parameters, the evaluation in the CEM is by a 2-step 
process, as described below: 
1) Collecting data of assessed outcome values of defined metrics by time period. 
2) Comparison of each calculated metric assessed value with the defined target value of 
that metric in the contract.   
In addition to this 2-step process, some academics mention applying weighting of 
metrics for the evaluation process (Canada and Sullivan, 1989).  Although weights can be 
applied within the CEM, it would decrease the level of objectivity of the model. In 
addition to that, favoring one metric over another may lead the contractor in the wrong 
direction. The viewpoint taken for the current research is that all of the metrics should be 
perceived as: the defined needs of the war fighter. Thus, none of them should be treated 
differently than the others.  
In conclusion, the CEM will be used for the first step to check whether or not the 
minimum contractual requirements are satisfied by period/term.   
Step 2: Building the Mathematical Model (MM) 
 
 First of all, defining a desired metric value within a time frame is the same as 
defining an outcome of a time function. By definition: “a function is a rule that assigns to 
each input number exactly one output number.”  (Haeussler et al., 2007)  
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 Secondly, the importance of PBL is demanding many different performance 
outcomes simultaneously at the end of certain time periods continuously. It can be 
illustrated with an explosion of a bomb example. Let’s assume that the bomb was 
triggered at time zero and as the time passes the blast expands in all directions 
simultaneously and the effect (the overall performance outcome) of the bomb is 
explained by the multidimensional expansion of the blast in the space.  
 Every metric in the PBL is a defined dimension in the space and they will expand 
in different directions following the triggering of the system. The periods of time at 
which we calculate the assessed values of the metrics are the snap shots of this 
continuous process. So in addition to calculating the assessed values of the metrics 
individually, we can also calculate the overall performance outcome (the expansion) of 
the system.  
 The MM proposes to calculate and analyze a sole number, the overall 
performance metric (OPM), for both the overall contractual expectation and the assessed 
overall performance of the system. These calculated numbers will be used to evaluate 
whether or not the overall expectation from the relevant metrics at defined times was 
addressed. Briefly, by defining the requirements for satisfying each parameter within a 
time frame, a multi-dimensional shape in the space is defined upfront in the contract. For 
example, if three parameters were defined in a PBL contract, then a four- dimensional 
volume is defined and the volume of the shape is the OPM of contract. The fourth 
dimension is time.  
 The MM model depends on a 4-step process.  The first step is building the 
customized integration formula (CIF) of the relevant metrics defined in the contract. The 
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important point of building the integration formula is defining the effect of each metric to 
the system. If it has a positive effect, then the time function representing that metric will 
be used in the numerator for its part in the formulation; otherwise it will be used in the 
denominator. For example, A0 (t) and R (t) are desired to be as much as possible (positive 
effect), but LRT (t) is desired to be as low as possible (negative effect). So A0 (t) and R 
(t) will be used in the numerator, but LRT (t) will be used in denominator. Equation (1) 
illustrates an example formulation of a customized integration formula to calculate the 
overall performance metric.    
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where   
 A0 (t), R0 (t) and LRT (t) are relevant time functions of the defined metrics, 
 g is the beginning of the term and h is the end of the term.    
 
 The second step is revealing the time functions of the parameters such as: A0 (t) 
, R (t) and LFP (t).  Equations (2) to (4) are used to calculate the coefficients of the 
independent variables. Briefly, Equation (2) is the general exhibition of the time 
functions of each metric, Equation (3) is the matrix form of the time functions and 
Equation (4) is the calculation of the coefficients of the relevant time functions.    
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where  
 n = the number of terms that performance data is evaluated for individual metrics  
xi  = the coefficients of independent variables in the function 
t   = the independent variables in the function 
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yk = the dependent variable in the function 
 
 Since we know the values of t, n and yk , we only need to calculate xi values in 
order to reveal the time functions of the relevant metrics. Hence, we will transform the 
general exhibition of time functions to matrix form as depicted in Equation (3). 
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where  
 A = matrix form of independent variables  
 B = matrix form of coefficients  
 C = matrix form of dependent variables 
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 Then we will use the mathematical approach depicted in Equation (4) to calculate 
the values of coefficients of the independent variables. 
 
11 −− ×=×× ACBAA  (4) 
where  
 A-1 = inverse of matrix A 
 
Third, Equations (2), (3), (4) and (1) are used iteratively to calculate the volume 
of the PBL shape for the relevant terms, in other words, the OPMs for the relevant terms 
of the PBL contract.  
We defined two different ways of finding the time functions of the relevant 
metrics via Equations (2), (3), (4) and applying them to Equation (1) to calculate OPMs.   
The first way may be calculating continuous time functions for each metric from 
point zero at the time scale to the actual point where the latest term is via Equations (2), 
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(3) and (4). The time functions are quadratic after the first term in this case and then 
Equation (1) (CIF) is applied via using the latest term’s and the previous term’s values of 
time on the time scale as boundaries of integrals to calculate the OPM of the relevant 
term. The sum of all terms’ OPMs will give us the overall OPM.    
The second way may be calculating discrete time functions for each metric from 
the previous term to the latest term via Equations (2), (3) and (4). The time functions will 
be linear in this case for all terms. Thus, Equation (1) (CIF) are applied via using only 0 
(zero) and 1(one) as boundaries of integrals to calculate OPMs.    
Finally, we will try to evaluate both approaches according to the analysis of the 
data. After that we will analyze each term via comparing the values of contractually-
demanded OPMs with assessed values of OPMs and then the findings will be evaluated. 
Step 3: Building the Integrated Model (IM) 
 
 The IM is built via combining and organizing the findings of the CEM and the 
MM. A table format is used to exhibit the IM which reveals the current situation of the 
system and the trend of the system. By this way, the decision makers would gain more 
insights about the system for which they are responsible. Additionally, the IM would be 
used as a mediator tool between the contractor and the Government for both negotiations 
and working on the solutions of the conflicts. Thus, it may be useful to build trust 
between the partners. 
Step 4: Analysis and Interpretation of the Findings 
 
  By the highly-elastic nature of the PBL, every IM is unique. However, concluding 
all of the findings gathered from either the CEM, or the MM, to see the big picture before 
the decision-making is the general idea of the IM.  
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Thus, the IM will be analyzed in order to understand both the overall performance 
and the general trend of the system. Finally, the conclusions depending on the evaluation 
of results will be interpreted. 
 
 
Data Sources / Format 
 
 
First of all, one of the aims of the current study is to test the applicability and the 
usefulness of the 4SPEM. Thus, PBL data from published sources was used. By doing so; 
examination of the results would benefit from the insights gathered via the studies of the 
previous researchers about the PBL contracts that they worked on. Additionally, the 
model in the current study may be evaluated with real life data.   
 
 
Data Analysis 
 
 
Two common technological tools: Microsoft Excel and Mathcad 14 are used to 
process the data, and perform the relevant analyses. However, the approach is not limited 
to these two applications.  Many kinds of mathematical tools including scientific 
calculators may be used.  
 
 
The Example Study 
 
 
 First of all in this example study, the usage of numbers and the mathematical 
equations are used as little as possible for the sake of simplicity. The aim of this example 
is to provide a better understanding of this thesis. 
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 Let’s assume that the contract is agreed between the two sides and at the end of 
each year the collected parameters are evaluated according to the CEM and all of them 
were satisfied according to the defined contract requirements. Can we assume that the 
contractor is successful and we would continue with that contractor? How about, 
although some parameters are in an upward trend, the others are declining or may be no 
different at all? The answers of these questions and the expected comparison between 
CEM and IM are depicted in Table 4. 18
                                                 
18 Contract metrics are satisfied for all terms. And they are compared with the contract and previous term;  and increase is defined   as 
“ ”decrease is defined as “ ” and no difference is defined   as “ ” and  it’s assumed that the overall performance metric is 
calculated as 1.5 from the contract according to MM. 
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Table 4. Theoretical Comparison of CEM with IM 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In this chapter, the methodology of the thesis is briefly explained. First, the map 
of the study is described via the Methodology Algorithm in Figure 13.  A holistic 
approach is adopted and the study is concentrated on the post-PBL period. The aim of the 
current study is to contribute to the area of evaluation processes and propose a model 
which should include: reasonability, elasticity, precision, capability, integrality and 
objectivity. 
Second, a 4-Step Process Evaluation Model (the 4SPEM) is defined. It starts with 
building the Current Evaluation Model (CEM), which has a 2-step sub process. It 
continues with building the Mathematical Model (MM). A 4-step sub process is defined 
to realize the MM with the underlying theories. However, we defined two different 
approaches in building the MM and we will use one of the two approaches after the 
evaluation process.  Next, building the Integrated Model (IM) is defined and the 
interpretation of the findings explained. Following that the expected data sources are 
explained with the format of the data and then the planned approach of the data analysis 
is defined.  
 Finally, a simple example of the thesis is illustrated in Table 4. The aim of the 
example is to provide a better understanding of the current study; therefore, the usage of 
numbers and mathematical formulas were limited.   
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IV. Analysis  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
  First of all, this research chose two real life PBL cases from published sources in 
order to apply the 4SPEM. Briefly, Case 1 is related to the Navy A-RCI19 and Virginia 
S/CC/A20
 Secondly, the 4SPEM
 Program. The research of Gansler and Lucyshyn (2006) is used for both 
explaining and gathering the data of performance metrics of the program. Case 2 is 
related to the C-17 Globemaster Sustainment Program and the research of Mahon (2007), 
is used as the data source for that case.  
21
                                                 
19 “The A-RCI is a four-phase program for transforming submarine sonar systems (AN/BSY-1, AN/BQQ-5 and AN/BQQ-6) from 
legacy systems to a more capable and flexible COTS/Open System Architecture (OSA) and is designated AN/BQQ-10” (Gansler and 
Lucyshyn, 2006, pp. 28) 
 
20 Virginia Class sonar,combat control and architecture (S/CC/A) 
 
21 the 4SPEM includes; Building the CEM, Building the MM, Building the IM ,Analyzing and Implementing the Findings 
 
  is applied to both cases and the applicability and the 
reliability of the model is checked. Microsoft Excel and Mathcad 14 are used as technical 
tools; however, other tools may be used according to the familiarity of the researcher. 
 The analyses and interpretation of the findings are done according to the 4SPEM 
at the end of each case. The primary concern is investigating whether or not the approach 
in the current study may reveal additional insights about the relevant PBL contracts.  
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Case 1  
 
 
The Navy A-RCI22 and Virginia S/CC/A23
1. The desired performance outcomes are mentioned in the PBL contract as: 
 Program; 
This PBL program is responsible for managing the entire Acoustic Rapid Commercial 
off the Shelf Insertion (A-RCI),  and Sonar Combat Control and Architecture 
(S/CC/A) supply chain process, from processing the requisition through the 
transportation to the fleet or the point of debarkation (for overseas delivery). The 
inventory is stored and repaired at the contractor’s Manassas facility (Gansler, 2006, 
p 31). 
 
a. “Supply Material Availability (SMA):  The contractual requirement for SMA is 
mentioned as 85 percent” (Gansler, 2006, p 31 ).  
b. “Average Customer Wait Time (ACWT):  ACWT requirement for issue priority 
group (IPG) I items for continental U.S. (CONUS) is 2 days.  
ACWT for IPG I items for outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS) is 3 days.  
ACWT requirements for IPG II items for CONUS and OCONUS are mentioned 
as within the required delivery date”  (Gansler, 2006, p 31).  
 The contractual requirements are depicted in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5. Contractual Requirements for Case 1  
(Gathered from Gansler and Lucyshyn, 2006) 
Monthly 
Terms 
S-04 
1 
O-04 
2 
N-04 
3 
D-04 
4 
J-05 
5 
F-05 
6 
M-05 
7 
A-05 
8 
SMA 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 
ACWT 
(CONUS) 
2 
days 
2 days 2 days 2 days 2 
days 
2 
days 
2 days 2 days 
ACWT 
(OCONUS)  
3 
days 
3 days 3 days 3 days 3 
days 
3 
days 
3  
days 
3  
days 
                                                 
22 The A-RCI is a four-phase program for transforming submarine sonar systems (AN/BSY-1, AN/BQQ-5 and AN/BQQ-6) from 
legacy systems to a more capable and flexible COTS/Open System Architecture (OSA) and is designated AN/BQQ-10. (Gansler and 
Lucyshyn, 2006) 
 
23 Virginia Class sonar,combat control and architecture (S/CC/A) 
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2. The achieved performance of the related metrics for the first eight months were as 
depicted in Table 6; 
 
 
Table 6. Achieved Average Performance Results for Case 1 
(Gathered from Gansler, 2006) 
Monthly 
Periods 
S-04 
1 
O-04 
2 
N-04 
3 
D-04 
4 
J-05 
5 
F-05 
6 
M-05 
7 
A-05 
8 
SMA 92.1% 89.5% 91.1%    86.4% 100.0% 97.5% 97.6% 96.4% 
ACWT 
(CONUS) 
1.8 
days 
2.0 
days 
1.1 
days 
2.3 
days 
1.7 
days 
1.6 
days 
1.8 
days 
1.9 
days 
ACWT 
(OCONUS)  
1.9 
days 
2.1 
days 
2.1 
days 
2.5 
days 
2.0 
days 
2.5 
days 
2.6 
days 
2.5 
days 
 
 
 
According to the data gathered from Gansler (2006), the evaluation process of the 
Program office depends on defining the needs in the contract, reflecting them via 
different metrics and calculating each term’s assessed values, and comparing them 
individually at the end. However, checking the assessed values with the contractual 
requirements indicates that there is a conflict between AWCT (CONUS) and the others at 
the forth month (D-04). Case 1 is analyzed with the same data via the 4SPEM.  
 
 
The 4SPEM for Case 1 
 
 
Step 1: Building the Current Evaluation Model (CEM). 
 
According to the CEM model, there are conflicts between SMA, ACWT 
(OCONUS) and ACWT (CONUS) at the fourth period. The contractor satisfied the 
requirements for two metrics; however, the requirements of AWCT (CONUS) were not 
satisfied. (See Table 7) 
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Table 7. The CEM Model of Case 1 
 
 
 
 
 The CEM of Case 1 reveals that there’s a conflict at the fourth month (D-04), 
because all performance metrics satisfied contractual requirements except  
ACWT (CONUS). In addition, all of the metrics have waving patterns. In conclusion, the 
overall performance trend of the system is hard to reveal.  
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Step 2: Building the Mathematical Model (MM). 
 
First of all, ACWT (CONUS) and ACWT (OCONUS) are measuring the same 
behavior which is the Logistics Response Time (LRT). Second, the achieved values of 
ACWT (OCONUS) satisfied the contractual requirements. Thus, the MM is built via 
using two metrics which are: SMA and ACWT (CONUS) for illustration.  
Additionally, the conflict experienced at the fourth month (D-04) can be resolved 
via proposing the OPM which would integrate the effects of two parameters into one 
metric.    
Building the Customized Integration Formula (CIF) for Case 1. 
 
First of all, the effect of each metric to the system should be understood in order 
to build the CIF; however, it is not necessary to calculate the correlations of the metrics. 
Defining an individual metric as bigger is better (+ effect), or smaller is better (- effect), 
is enough to build the formula. (See Table 8) 
 
 
Table 8. The Effects of the metrics 
Metrics The bigger is 
better? 
The effect of the 
metric 
SMA YES (+) 
ACWT (CONUS) NO (-) 
 
 
 
The CIF is built according to defined effects of the metrics for Case 1 using Equation (1) 
and it is depicted in Equation (5).  
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  where 
  OPM  = the overall performance metric  
SMA (t)  =  time function of SMA metric  
  AWCT (t) =  time function of AWCT metric 
g  = the beginning of the term 
h  = the end of the term
  
 
 
Finding the Time Functions of the Metrics. 
 
Two approaches are defined for finding time functions. In the first approach a 
continuous quadratic time function (CQTF) is built throughout the time scale from point 
zero to the latest data point for each term. In the second approach, a discrete linear time 
function (DLTF) is built from the previous data point to the current data point for each 
period. The following steps guide both approaches. 
  First the contractually-defined time functions of the parameters are calculated for 
each term of contract. Then the time functions of the achieved performance results are 
calculated for each term of the contract.  Equations (2), (3) and (4) are used iteratively to 
calculate the time functions of each metric for the relevant terms via the Mathcad 14 
program and the end of the 1st term (S-04) is accepted as the origin time (time zero) in 
our calculations.24
                                                 
24 Since we don’t have the performance data of the previous term before S=04, we started from S-04. Therefore,  S-04 
= t1=0, O-04 = t2=1, …, A-05= t8 =7 
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The time functions are unique both for each metric and for each term. This 
reflects reality, because in the real life, activities that take place to satisfy the contractual 
agreement are not stopped before the evaluation. Besides, a snapshot picture is taken and 
the evaluation is made while the system continuously keeps moving and the time 
functions are evolving relative to the data cumulated.  
In this case, first the continuous quadratic time functions (CQTF) is found at the 
end of each term for each metric for both the contract and the assessed values. 
1) Building Continuous Quadratic Time Functions (CQTF) 
a) The contractually-defined CQTF’s of the metrics for Case 1 
Both metrics are defined to be satisfied as constant values at the bottom-line as 
seen in Table 7. Thus, they are represented as depicted in Equations (6) and (7) for all 
terms without changing. 
 
085)( ttSMAc =  (6) 
where   
SMA(t)  =  time function of SMA metric   
   
02)( ttAWCTc =  (7) 
where   
AWCT(t) =  time function of AWCT metric  
 
 
  
b) The assessed CQTF’s of the Metrics for Case 1 
After calculating the contractually-defined time functions of the parameters, the 
time functions of the assessed values of the parameters are calculated according to the 
actual annual averages of the parameters.  
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The iterative calculations defined in Equations (2), (3) and (4) are made via  
Matcad 14 to reveal the time functions for the assessed values of the defined metrics of 
the relevant terms. The calculations of first four terms are depicted in Appendix A.  
The relevant time functions of the terms are depicted in Equation (8), through 
Equation (21). 
 
 
1.9226)(1 +−= ttSMAa  (8) 
where   
SMAa1 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 1st term 
 
 
8.12.0)(1 += ttAWCTa  (9) 
where   
AWCTa1 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 1st term  
 
 
1.92471.2)( 22 +−−= tttSMAa  (10) 
where   
SMAa2 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 2nd term 
 
  
8.175.055.0)( 22 ++−= tttAWCTa  (11) 
where   
AWCTa2 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 2nd term  
 
 
1.922.835.775.1)( 233 +−+−= ttttSMAa  (12) 
where   
SMAa3 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 3rd term 
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8.1817.115.2533.0)( 233 ++−−= ttttAWCTa  (13) 
where   
AWCTa3 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 3rd term 
 
 
1.92975.16437.2352.10462.1)( 2344 +−+−= tttttSMAa  (14) 
where   
SMAa4 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 4th term 
 
 
8.1592.3404.5208.2296.0)( 2344 ++−+−= tttttAWCTa  (15) 
where   
AWCTa4 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 4th term 
 
 
1.92795.35
646.6297.37304.9784.0)( 23455
+−
+−+−=
t
tttttSMAa
 (16) 
where   
SMAa5 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 5th term 
 
 
8.1252.6
946.10187.6404.1111.0)( 23455
++
−+−=
t
tttttAWCTa
 (17) 
where   
AWCTa5 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 5th term 
 
 
1.92746.71
675.144256.105683.34253.5297.0)( 234566
+−
+−+−=
t
ttttttSMAa  (18) 
where   
SMAa6 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 6th term 
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8.1087.10698.19
366.13112.4558.0032.0)(
2
3456
6
++−
+−+−=
tt
tttttAWCTa
 (19) 
where 
AWCTa6 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 6th term 
 
 
1.92783.48914.88586.54
147.1210577.3317.0028.0)(
1
7
2
6
3
5
4
4
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3
36
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where   
SMAa7 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 7th term 
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+−−+−
×++×−= −−
tttt
ttttAWCTa  (21) 
 
where   
AWCTa7 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 7th term 
 
 
Calculation of OPMs for CQTF 
 
Since we calculated all the necessary time functions of the relevant metrics for 
each term, we can calculate the OPMs for each term both for the contractual and the 
assessed performance values using Equation (5).   
Table 9 organizes the calculated OPMs for both the contract and the assessed 
values. The mentioned terms in the table refer to the time frame between two consecutive 
terms of Table 7. For example, 1st term of Table 9 covers the time frame between S-04 
and O-04 of Table 7. ΔOPMs refer to the difference between OPM ASSESSED and OPM 
CONTRACT in the table.  
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Table 9. The Calculated Values of OPMs via CQTF 
TERMS OPM CONTRACT OPM ASSESSED Δ OPM's 
1st 42.5 47.834 5.334 
2nd 42.5 56.377 13.877 
3rd 42.5 68.43 25.93 
4th 42.5 4656 4613.5 
5th 42.5 75.133 32.633 
6th 42.5 22.992 -19.508 
7th 28.863 23.298 -5.565 
All  283.863 4950.064 4666.2 
 
 
 
Analysis of CQTF-included MM 
 
 The MM Model with CQTF Case 1 reveals that ACWT (CONUS) is not satisfied 
for the contractual requirements according to D-04 (4th month) at the CEM. The OPM 
satisfied the contractual requirements according to the contract between 3rd   and 4th 
periods.  
 However, a fluctuation is experienced at the 4th period. The reflection of the 
previous term’s performance effects might be considerable, but the amount of fluctuation 
makes it almost impossible. In addition to that, although the contractor’s performance for 
both metrics was much higher for the 6th, 7th and 8th months as depicted in Table 7, our 
model proposes the reverse as seen from 6th and 7th terms of assessed OPM values as 
negative. Finally, discontinuities are experienced while the relevant terms’ CQTF’s are 
applied to Equation (5)25
 In conclusion, CQTF-included MM is not validated because of the erroneous 
numbers caused by the use of continuous function. Thus, the MM is built according to a 
.  
                                                 
25 Equation (5) became discontinuous between 6,and 6.1759  at 7th term when Equations(20) and (21)  were applied 
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second approach, which is Discrete Linear Time Functions (DLTF) included MM. Then 
the findings are examined in order to attempt to validate the approach and interpret the 
results if the model is validated. 
Finding the Time Functions of the Metrics. 
 
1) Building Discrete Linear Time Functions (DLTF) 
a) The contractually-defined DLTF’s of the metrics for Case 1 
Both metrics are defined as being satisfied by the constant values at the bottom-
line as seen in Table 7. Thus, they are represented as depicted in Equations (6) and (7) for 
all terms without changing. 
b) The assessed DLTF’s of the Metrics for Case 1 
First of all, the iterative calculations defined in Equations (2), (3) and (4) are used 
for calculating the DLTF’s for each metric. The relevant calculations are made from the 
previous term to the latest term via Matcad 14. By doing so, the time functions for the 
assessed values of defined metrics are revealed for relevant terms. The calculations of the 
first four terms are depicted in Appendix B. Secondly, the relevant time functions of the 
terms will be linear and they are depicted from Equation (22), to Equation (33). 
 
1.9226)(1 +−= ttSMAa  (22) 
where   
SMAa1 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 1st term 
 
 
8.12.0)(1 += ttAWCTa  (23) 
where   
AWCTa1 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 1st term 
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2 ( ) 1.6 89.5aSMA t t= +  (24) 
where   
SMAa2 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 2nd term 
 
 
2 ( ) 0.9 2aAWCT t t= +  (25) 
where   
AWCTa2 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 2nd term 
 
 
3 ( ) 4.7 91.1aSMA t t= − +  (26) 
where   
SMAa3 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 3rd term 
 
 
3 ( ) 1.2 1.1aAWCT t t= +  (27) 
where   
AWCTa3 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 3rd term 
 
 
4 ( ) 13.6 86.4aSMA t t= +  (28) 
where   
SMAa4 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 4th term 
 
 
4 ( ) 0.6 2.3aAWCT t t= − +  (29) 
where   
AWCTa4 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 4th term 
 
 
5 ( ) 2.5 100aSMA t t= − +  (30) 
 where   
SMAa5 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 5th term 
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5 ( ) 0.1 1.7aAWCT t t= − +  (31) 
where   
AWCTa5 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 5th term 
 
 
6 ( ) 0.1 97.5aSMA t t= +  (32) 
where   
SMAa6 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 6th term  
 
 
6 ( ) 0.2 1.6aAWCT t t= +  (33) 
 
where 
AWCTa6 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 6th term 
 
 
7 ( ) 1.2 97.6aSMA t t= − +  (34) 
where 
SMAa7 (t)  =  time function of SMA metric for the 7th term 
 
 
7 ( ) 0.1 1.9aAWCT t t= +  (35) 
where 
AWCTa7 (t) =  time function of AWCT metric for the 7th term 
 
 
Calculation of OPMs for DLTF-included MM. 
 
Equation (5) is used to calculate the OPMs for each term both for the contractual 
and the assessed performance metrics, but this time, 0 (zero) and 1(one) are used for the 
boundaries of the integrals, because of using DLTF’s. The area of interest is between the 
lines connecting the actual and assessed values.   
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Table 10 organizes the calculated OPMs for both the contract and the assessed 
values. The table refers to the time frame between two consecutive terms of Table 7. For 
example , the 1st term of Table 10 covers the time frame between S-04 and O-04 of Table 
7. ΔOPMs refer to the difference between OPM ASSESSED and OPM CONTRACT in 
the table.  
 
 
Table 10. The Calculated Values of OPMs via DLTF 
TERMS OPM CONTRACT OPM ASSESSED Δ OPM's 
1st 42.5 47.8 5.334 
2nd 42.5 60 17.483 
3rd 42.5 54.6 12.052 
4th 42.5 47 4.454 
5th 42.5 59.9 17.367 
6th 42.5 57.4 14.949 
7th 42.5 49.8 7.254 
All  283.863 376 78.893 
 
 
 
Analysis of DLTF-included MM 
 
First of all, DLTF-included MM is validated both via the experts’ opinions and 
via the results gathered. The assessed OPM values indicate that the contractor satisfied 
the contractual requirements for all terms by means of OPMs. However, the overall 
performance of the contractor has a waving pattern as seen from the OPM ASSESSED 
values. The overall performance behavior of the system also has a waving pattern as seen 
from the values of ΔOPMs.  In conclusion, the MM adds additional insights over the 
insights gained from the CEM and the IM is built at the next step.  
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Step 3: Building the Integrated Model (IM) 
 
 First of all, the data of Case 1are processed and analyzed at the individual metric 
level via the CEM and then the same data are processed and analyzed via the MM to 
calculate the overall performance at the system level. The next step is building the IM in 
order to organize and integrate the cumulated results of the CEM and the MM and a 
dashboard form is used for this purpose as depicted in Table 11. 
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Table 11. The Dashboard Form of Integrated Model (IM) of Case 1 
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Step 4: Analysis and Interpretation of the Findings  
 
First of all, although ACWT (CONUS) didn’t satisfy the contractual requirements 
according to D-04 (4th month) at the CEM, the OPM values satisfied the contractual 
requirements according to the contract within the 3rd and 4th   terms at the MM. However, 
this shouldn’t be interpreted as favoring the contractor despite its low level of 
performance. On the contrary, the contractor should achieve at least 92% for the SMA 
metric and 1.9 days for the AWCT (CONUS) metric instead of 85% and 2 days 
respectively for the 4th term in order to satisfy the contractually-mandated OPM of 42.5 
points according to our sensitivity analysis (See Appendix C).  
 As seen from this example, the OPM may also be a useful tool to resolve a 
potential conflict via creating a win-win situation for both parties. From the 
Government’s perspective, although the contractual limits kept fixed for the relevant 
metrics, the OPM enabled the limits to increase dynamically from the point where the 
conflict was experienced to the next month. (4th term of Table 10) By this way, a chance 
is given to the contractor, but a higher performance requirement is set automatically. 
Thus, the contractor is motivated for a higher performance. From the contractor’s 
perspective, a chance is given to him to prove its capabilities within one term without a 
penalty.  
 It is also seen that the contractor is struggling to set his performance at a high 
level. Basically there’s a waving pattern of the contractor’s performance and the overall 
performance of the contractor should be investigated and analyzed. This may be revealed 
by comparing the contractual overall performance metric (OPM) with the assessed OPM 
by the contractor. (See Figure 15)  
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Figure 14. The Comparison of Assessed OPMs with Contractual OPMs  
 
  
 As seen in the figure, the contractor’s overall performance has a waving pattern 
with a period of four months, in which the first two months have an increasing behavior 
and the last two months have a decreasing behavior.  
 Although the amount of the data may not be enough to make a forecast about the 
following terms, it may be expected that the following two months after the 7th month 
will be an inclining period of overall performance and there would be a decrease of 
performance between the 9th and 11th months. The lowest points of this waving pattern 
are very close to the contractually-defined bottom line and the 11th month may be very 
risky for both parties by means of satisfying the contractual requirements. Figure 16 
depicts the overall performance trend of the system via considering the differences of the 
assessed OPMs and contractual OPMs. 
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Figure 15. The Performance Trend of the System  
 
 
 
 First of all, the overall performance of the system is not stabilized. It peaks at the 
2nd term and the bottom point is at the 4th term. Secondly, the difference of the bottom 
and the peak performance points of the system are nearly 14 points. Finally, the bottom 
point is nearly 4 points and it is very close to the zero level performance which is the 
border of satisfaction and dissatisfaction level of the system.  
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Case 2 
 
 
C-17 Globemaster Sustainment Program;  
 
In this case there are five metrics that can be examined using the 4SPEM and the 
following section is taken from Mahon, 2007 until the first step of the 4SPEM. 
1. The desired performance outcomes are mentioned in the PBL contract as: 
 
Globemaster Sustainment Aircraft Availability (GSAA): The required 
performance in this measure is to maximize the number of aircraft available 
for missions. The requirement equals the percentage of mission capable 
aircraft relative to total fleet assigned. It is a monthly measurement and is 
adjusted to account for aircraft undergoing modification. The measure 
provides a 90-day period following surge operations during which Boeing is 
relieved of meeting the performance measurement if the metric variance is 
five percent less than the previous 12 months average as measured prior to the 
surge. The annual performance will be the 12-month average of the adjusted 
GSAA requirement (Mahon, 2007, p 62). 
 
Flying Hours Achievable (FHA): The required performance in this measure is 
to maintain the highest level of flying hours available for wartime mission 
availability based upon the Weapon System Management Information 
System- Sustainability Assessment Module (WSMIS-SAM). The 
measurement is the percent of wartime flying hours achieved given spares 
availability compared to the number of required hours as compiled by 
WSMIS-SAM. It is measured the first week of the month. Upon receipt of 
readiness spares packages (RSP), Boeing is given a 60-day grace period to 
reconcile the RSP, during which the measurement is not counted (Mahon, 
2007, p 63). 
 
Mission Capable (MICAP): The required performance in this measure is to 
deliver MICAP assets within 48 hours in the continental United States 
(CONUS) and within 96 hours in the FMS United Kingdom. The 
measurement is the percent of MICAP events successfully fulfilled within the 
48 hours CONUS or 96 hours UK compared to the actual number of MICAP 
events. The event starts when the Government requests MICAP services and 
documents it in a MICAP log and ends when the MICAP item is received at 
the end destination and entered into the Standard Base Supply System 
(Mahon, 2007, p 63). 
 
Aircraft Depot Maintenance Scheduling Effectiveness (ADMSE): The 
required performance in this measure is completion of scheduled maintenance 
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tasks to include negotiated and approved work, including over and above 
work requirements, within the negotiated schedule time. Performance is 
calculated by dividing the number of days taken to complete scheduled 
maintenance tasks by the negotiated number of days. The goal is to maximize 
the amount of work done within the negotiated time.  (Mahon, 2007, p 63) 
 
Issue Effectiveness (IE): It represents the number of issue requests filled 
compared to the number received and is a monthly measure. Issue 
effectiveness at new bed down bases will not be counted in overall issue 
effectiveness during the time aircraft are being delivered. This measure has 
incentives to forecast demand rather than rely on past demands.  (Mahon, 
2007, p 63) 
 
Customer Satisfaction (CS): The required performance in this measure is 
customer satisfaction. Using a concept called the shared destiny/operating 
principles, the customer scores 11 focus areas of the performance work 
statement across six criteria .Administered quarterly, the survey coincides 
with the award-fee schedule. The survey is distributed to the C-17 Special 
Program Office, C-17 system support manager, using commands and the 
Defense Contract Management Agency. The rating is determined by 
averaging scores in each focus area and then averaging all areas to obtain a 
single rating.  (Mahon, 2007, p 63) 
  
 The contractually-defined requirements for the Case 2 are organized and depicted 
in Table 12. 
 
 
 
Table 12. Contractual Requirements for Case 2  
(Adapted from Mahon, 2007) 
REQUIRED 
PERFORMANCE FOR 
RELATED METRICS 
FISCAL YEARS 
FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 
GSAA26 69 71.7 74.2 78.4 79.1 
FHA 95 95 95 95 95 
MICAP 80 80 80 80 80 
ADMSE 98-100 98-100 98-100 98-100 98-100 
IE (XD items) 82 82 82 82 82 
IE (All other items) 67 75 78 80 80 
CS 2-5 2-5 2-5 2-5 2-5 
                                                 
26 The contractual requirement of GSAA for the first three periods were: 75.0% , 76.3%, 77.6% and they were revised as it is 
mentioned in Table 13. 
   
 76 
 
 
3. The achieved performance levels of the first three years are depicted in Table 13. 
 
 
Table 13. Achieved Average Performance Results for Case 2  
(Adapted from Mahon, 2008) 
ACHIEVED PERFORMANCE 
FOR RELATED METRICS 
FISCAL YEARS 
FY04 FY05 FY06 
GSAA27 74.1 73.7 74.4 
FHA 97.3 98.9 99.2 
MICAP 90.2 96.1 91.5 
ADMSE 100.06 100.08 100.4 
IE  76.5 76.2 79 
CS N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
 
According to the data gathered from Mahon, 2008 we can start to build the 
4SPEM of Case 2. 
 
 
the 4SPEM for Case 2 
 
 
Step 1: Building the Current Evaluation Model (CEM). 
 
First of all the GSAA, FHA, MICAP, ADMSE and IE are used in the CEM. 
Second, for GSAA the adjusted requirement, for ADMSE the minimum range and for the 
rest of the metrics the requirements are be used as bottom-line constraints.  
Secondly, the bottom-line of each individual metric is defined according to the 
contract and then the assessed values of these metrics are checked for the relevant terms 
in CEM. The CEM of the C-17 program is depicted in Table 14. 
                                                 
27 Eighty-five percent of the award fee is based upon the GSAA performance measurement. 
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Table 14. The CEM of C-17 Globemaster 
Fiscal 
Years 
FY04 FY05 FY06 
Metrics Bottom-
line  
Actual-
Annual 
average 
Satis-
fied 
Bottom-
line  
Actual-
Annual 
average 
Satis-
fied 
Bottom-
line  
Actual-
Annual 
average 
Satis-
fied 
GSAA 69.0 74.1 YES 71.7 73.7 YES 74.2 74.4 YES 
FHA 95 97.3 YES 95 98.9 YES 95 99.2 YES 
MICAP  80 90.2 YES 80 96.1 YES 80 91.5 YES 
ADMSE 98 100.06 YES 98 100.08 YES 98 100.4 YES 
IE 67 76.5 YES 75 76.2 YES 78 79 YES 
 
 
 
As seen from the CEM, each one of the performance metrics satisfied the 
contractual requirements individually. However, some of the assessed values of the 
metrics are plateauing such as GSAA, some of them have an upward trend such as FHA 
and ADMSE, and some of them have waving patterns such as MICAP and IE. 
Additionally, the overall performance trend of the system is hard to reveal.  
Step 2: Building the Mathematical Model (MM). 
 
Building the Customized Integration Formulas (CIF’s) for Case 2. 
 
First of all, the effects of each metric should be understood from the system’s 
perspective. However, it is not necessary to calculate the correlations of the metrics. 
Defining an individual metric as bigger is better (+ effect), or smaller is better (- effect), 
is enough to build the integration formula. Table 15 depicts the defined effects of the 
metrics according to the contract. 
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Table 15. The Effects of the metrics 
Metrics The bigger is better? The effect of the metric 
GSAA YES (+) 
FHA YES (+) 
MICAP  YES (+) 
ADMSE YES (+) 
IE YES (+) 
 
 
 
Secondly, all of the defined metrics have positive effects on the system according 
to the gathered data. Although it’s out of the scope of this study, it may be argued to 
define only positive effect metrics in the contract at Pre-PBL phase may be a concern. 
One or more negative effect metrics should be defined in any kinds of PBL contracts to 
avoid the “more is better” only mindset.  
Finally, the CIF is built according to defined effects of the metrics for Case 2 
using Equation (1) and it is depicted in Equation (36).  
 
 
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫××××=
h
g
h
g
h
g
g
g
h
g
dttIEdttADMSEdttMICAPdttFHAdttGSAAOPM ).().().().().(  (36) 
where 
 GSAA(t)  = the relevant time function of GSAA metric 
 FHA(t) = the relevant time function of FHA metric 
 MICAP(t) = relevant time function of MICAP metric 
 ADMSE(t) = relevant time function of ADMSE metric 
 IE(t)  = relevant time function of IE metric  
g   = the beginning of the term 
h   = the end of the term
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Finding the Time Functions of the Metrics. 
 
1) Building Discrete Linear Time Functions (DLTF) 
 First of all, building the MM via discrete linear time functions (DLTF’s) was 
shown in Case 1. Thus, the iterative calculations which were defined in Equations (2), (3) 
and (4) are used for calculating the DLTF’s for each metric from the previous term to the 
latest term to reveal the time functions for both the contractually-defined and the assessed 
values of the metrics for relevant terms. (See Appendix D) 
Secondly, the relevant time functions of the terms are linear and they are depicted 
from Equation (37), to Equation (56). 
a) The Contractually-defined DLTF’s of the Metrics for Case 2 
The contractually-defined time functions of the relevant metrics for the 1st and the 
2nd terms are depicted from Equation (37) to Equation (46). 
697.2)(1 += ttGSAAc  (37) 
where 
GSAAc1 (t) = the time function of GSAA metric for the 1st term     
   
 
95)(1 =tFHAc  (38) 
where 
FHA c1 (t) = the time function of FHA metric for the 1st term     
 
 
80)(1 =tMICAPc  (39) 
where 
MICAP c1 (t) = the time function of MICAP metric for the 1st term     
 
98)(1 =tADMSEc  (40) 
 where ADMSE c1 (t) = the time function of ADMSE metric for the 1st term  
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 678)(1 += ttIEc  (41) 
where 
IE c1 (t) = the time function of IE metric for the 1st term     
 
  
7.715.2)(2 += ttGSAAc  (42) 
 where GSAAc2 (t) = the time function of GSAA metric for the 2nd term  
 
 
95)(2 =tFHAc  (43) 
 where 
FHA c2 (t) = the time function of FHA metric for the 2nd term 
 
 
80)(2 =tMICAPc  (44) 
 where 
MICAP c2 (t) = the time function of MICAP metric for the 2nd term  
 
 
98)(2 =tADMSEc  (45) 
where 
ADMSE c2 (t) = the time function of ADMSE metric for the 2nd term  
 
 
753)(2 += ttIEc  (46) 
where 
IE c2 (t) = the time function of IE metric for the 2nd term      
 
 
b) The Assessed DLTF’s of the Metrics for Case 2 
The assessed time functions of the relevant metrics for the 1st and the 2nd terms 
are depicted from Equation (47) to Equation (56). 
1.744)(1 +−= ttGSAAa  (47) 
where 
GSAAa1 (t) = the time function of GSAA metric for the 1st term    
  
 
 81 
3.976.1)(1 += ttFHAa  (48) 
where 
FHA a1 (t) = the time function of FHA metric for the 1st term     
 
 
2.909.5)(1 += ttMICAPa  (49) 
where 
MICAP a1 (t) = the time function of MICAP metric for the 1st term     
 
 
6.10002)(1 += ttADMSEa  (50) 
where 
ADMSE a1 (t) = the time function of ADMSE metric for the 1st term      
 
 
5.763.0)(1 +−= ttIEa  (51) 
where 
IE a1 (t) = the time function of IE metric for the 1st term     
 
 
 7.737.0)(2 += ttGSAAa  (52) 
where 
GSAAa2 (t) = the time function of GSAA metric for the 2nd term  
 
 
9.983.0)(2 += ttFHAa  (53) 
where 
FHA a2 (t) = the time function of FHA metric for the 2nd term     
 
 
1.966.4)(2 +−= ttMICAPa  (54) 
where 
MICAP a2 (t) = the time function of MICAP metric for the 2nd term     
 
 
08.10032.0)(2 += ttADMSEa  (55) 
where 
ADMSE a2 (t) = the time function of ADMSE metric for the 2nd term      
2.768.2)(2 += ttIEa  (56) 
where 
IE a2 (t) = the time function of IE metric for the 2nd term      
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Calculation of OPMs for Case 2. 
 
Since we calculated all the necessary time functions of the relevant metrics, we 
will use Equation (36) to calculate the OPMs for each term both for the contractual and 
the assessed performance metrics.  
Fiscal year (FY) 2004 is accepted as the origin time (time zero) in our 
calculations28
Table 16. The Calculated Values of OPMs 
 and Table 16 organizes the calculated OPMs for both the contractual and 
the assessed values. The terms in the table refer to the time frame between two 
consecutive terms of Table 14. ΔOPMs refer to the differences between OPM 
ASSESSED and OPM CONTRACT in the table. 
 
 
TERMS 
OPM CONTRACT 
(x109) 
OPM ASSESSED 
(x109) 
Δ OPM's 
(x109) 
1st 3.72 5.192 1.472 
2nd 4.156 5.352 1.196 
All  7.876 10.544 2.668 
 
 
 
Analysis of the MM for Case 2  
 
First of all, the contractually demanded overall performance requirements were 
satisfied for both terms. However, the overall performance of the contractor has a 
plateauing trend as seen from the OPM ASSESSED values. A declining trend is also seen 
for the overall performance behavior of the system via the values of ΔOPMs.  
                                                 
28 FY 2004 = t1=0, FY2005 = t2=1, FY 2006 = t3 = 2 
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Secondly, it is revealed that the Government set the OPM low for the first term 
and the contractor achieved nearly 40% higher OPM. The Government’s OPM 
expectation increased 11.72% for the second term, but the contractor’s performance of 
achieving OPM stayed very low relative to that expectation and increased only 3% for the 
second term.    
Step 3: Building the Integrated Model (IM) 
 
 First of all the data of Case 2 are processed and analyzed at the individual metric 
level via the CEM and then the same data are processed and analyzed via the MM to 
calculate the overall performance at the system level. The next step is building the IM in 
order to organize and integrate the cumulated results of the CEM and the MM and a 
dashboard form is used for this purpose as depicted in Table 17. 
Finally, the overall performance trend of the contractor and the overall 
performance trend of the system are investigated and analyzed. The amount of the data 
may seem not enough to make a forecast; however, the data belong to already processed 
annual terms which includes 36 monthly terms. Table 17 organizes and integrates the 
cumulated results of the CEM and the MM and represents the main body of the IM. 
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Table 17. The Dashboard Form of Integrated Model (IM) of Case 2 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: Analysis and Interpretation of the Findings  
 
First of all, the contractor satisfied all the contractual requirements both at the 
individual and at the overall metric level. Although each assessed value of the individual 
metrics has a different trend at every term, the assessed values of the OPMs have a very 
stable trend for the relevant terms.  
Secondly, there’s no conflict experienced so far; however, the contractor’s overall 
performance trend is plateauing while time passes. On the contrary, the overall 
performance expectanctions of the Government is increasing; therefore, a conflict may be 
experienced in the following terms when the Government’s increasing expectations 
became infeasible for the contractor.  
Furthermore, the success of the contractor may be arguable for the first term. 
Because according to a basic comparison between the contractually-defined OPM and the 
assessed value of the OPM for the first term, the bottom-line OPM may be set lower than 
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necessary for the first term by the Government, and the contractor may pick the lower 
hanging fruit.  
Figure 17 depicts the comparison of the contractually-defined OPMs with the 
assessed values of the OPMs.  
 
   
 
Figure 16. The Comparison of Assessed OPMs with Contractual OPMs 
 
 
 
As seen from the figure, the contractor’s overall performance has a slightly 
upward trend, but the contractual expectation for the overall performance has a relatively 
higher upward trend. The slope of the ASSESSED function in the figure is 0.16; 
however, the slope of the CONTRACT is 0.436 which is nearly 2.725 times greater than 
the ASSESSED.  
Briefly, the contractual expectation increases 2.725 units for each unit increment 
of contractor’s achievement so far. This supports our proposal of expectation for a 
conflict in the near future between the Government and the contractor for this case.   
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Additionally, the overall performance trend of the system should also be taken 
into consideration. Figure 18 reveals this trend via the reflecting the differences of the 
assessed OPMs and contractual OPMs. 
  
 
 
Figure 17. The Performance Trend of the System 
 
 
The overall performance trend of the system has a downward trend and the slope 
of this function is -0.276.  It may be proposed that the system is heading to the zero level 
performance difference which is the border of satisfaction level. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
First of all, the 4SPEM is applied to two real life cases to investigate whether or 
not it could reveal additional insights for the decision makers. Each one of the cases has 
different properties and both of them are benefit from assess the model.  
time
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Case 1 has both positive and negative effect metrics and two main problems were 
experienced which are: discontinuity effects and huge fluctuations while applying the 
Continuous Quadratic Time Functions (CQTF’s) included MM. Further investigation 
revealed that the relevant continuous time functions became very problematic, especially 
the ones that belong to the negative effect metrics, while applying the CIF because of 
high quadratic terms and increasing values of coefficients. Therefore, the 4SPEM is 
upgraded, and the Discrete Linear Time Functions (DLTF’s) approach is used. 
Additionally, a conflict situation is investigated and a reasonable resolution for that 
situation is proposed via the 4SPEM. After examining the model results, it is understood 
that it may be applicable to other cases. 
Case 2 has many different metrics and the applicability of the model is tested for 
many-metrics situation. Additionally, there is an increasing set of contractual 
requirements in the case. The Government’s decision of setting an upward trend for the 
minimum level of satisfaction for the selected metrics may imply two issues. First, there 
may be conflicts between the assessed values of the metrics at the individual level if the 
contractor finds it easier to play on some metrics rather than all. Second, demanding an 
incremental trend for individual metrics may be demanding an infeasible overall 
performance from the contractor eventually. 
Finally, we could analyze the overall performance patterns of both the contractor 
and the system for the short run. Furthermore the 4SPEM enabled us to make forecasts as 
well as gain additional insights for the long run.    
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V. Conclusions 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 First of all, PBL is a relatively new and challenging concept and it was created to 
satisfy the highly-elastic needs of the war fighter through the GWOT. The main promise 
of the PBL is: enabling and sustaining a desired level of performance with a reasonable 
cost via the innovative approaches and the cumulated experiences of the contractors. 
 However, this study revealed that the promised benefits are not always gathered 
by the Government for all cases. Two possible causes of this situation may be 
inappropriately-defined metrics and incapability of evaluation processes.  
In this study a holistic approach is adopted and the post-PBL period is 
concentrated on, to contribute to the area of evaluation processes. Therefore, the 4-Step 
Process Evaluation Model (the 4SPEM) is proposed for evaluation of the defined metrics 
to monitor the system and to make healthy decisions about it. Then the model is 
examined via applying it to two selected real life cases.  
The research revealed that the 4SPEM may be a very useful tool for the decision 
makers. First, it can be applicable to different kinds of PBL contracts. Second, it helps to 
gain additional insights about the performance of the system both at the individual 
metrics level and at the overall system level. Third, it may reveal the possible future 
performance patterns of both the contractors and the system. Finally, it may offer a 
possible resolution of a conflict situation to both parties of a PBL contract.  
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 In conclusion, the core objectives which are: simplicity, reasonability, elasticity, 
precision, capability, integrality and objectivity are fulfilled while proposing the 4-
SPEM.   
 
 
The Gathered Answers to Investigative Questions 
 
 
1) What are the general metrics defined in the contracts?  
 Actually, there’s neither a standard template for PBL contracts, nor standardized 
metrics. However, relevant to their knowledge about PBL, the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) mentioned some useful metrics as: Operational Availability (Ao), 
Operational Reliability (R), Cost per Unit Usage (CUU), Logistics Footprint (LF) and 
Logistics Response Time (LRT) in their published book of “Performance Based 
Logistics: A Program Manager's Product Support Guide”, also known as PBL Guide. 
(DAU, 2005)  
 However, some academics mentioned that these metrics are high level composite 
metrics (Kumar et al., 2007). So in each PBL contract, some or all of these metrics should 
be tailored according to the desired goals and would be negotiated with the contractor/s. 
2) What is the general current evaluation method of the metrics?  
According to the experts’ opinions, in most of the PBL contracts, the metrics are 
evaluated by a two step process that is: 
a) Collecting assessed values of the metrics within the contractually-defined terms. 
(ex: average monthly values)  
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b) Comparing assessed values of the metrics with the contractually targeted numbers 
of those metrics individually.29
3) What are the gaps of the current evaluation method? 
   
a) According to the laws of statistics, each one of the pair wise comparisons includes 
risks of making type 1 and type 2 errors, which are the probabilities of making 
misjudgments depending on a statistical comparison. The probability of making a 
mistake in comparisons increases as the number of pairs compared increases. 
b) According to the Theory of Constraints; local improvements do not necessarily 
mean that the whole system improved (Goldratt and Cox, 1992). By monitoring 
each metric individually, we may not visualize the big picture and make healthy 
decisions at a strategic level.  
c) The current evaluation method may be useful in order to understand if the 
assessed values of the individual metrics satisfied the contractual agreements. 
However, as some academics mentioned, there may be conflicts between the 
metrics such as: “some metrics may be over performing while the others are 
underperforming” (Sols et al., 2007).  
d) “The scarcest resource in an organization is a manager’s time” (Kaplan and 
Cooper. 1997, p.144). The evaluation of the metrics individually may consume 
more time than necessary especially for the senior executives for two reasons. 
First, there may be an excessive amount of defined parameters and the decision 
maker may need time to understand the impact of each one of them on the system.  
                                                 
29 In addition to these two processes, some experts mentioned in some cases a process of weighing the parameters and calculating a 
single number for strategic decisions. This additional step to the current evaluation method is mentioned under the subject heading of  
“Evaluation Process of PBL” at the end of the Literature Review.     
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Second, there may be conflicts between parameters. Although the decision maker 
may spend much time and effort, s/he may not use the performance data 
appropriately in the decision-making process (US GAO July 2008, Highlights).         
4) How should the metrics be evaluated to improve decision making? 
First, the assessed values of the individual metrics should be evaluated by means 
of satisfying the contractual requirements at the bottom-line. Second, a further step would 
be taken and the system should be evaluated as a whole. Third, the gathered results of the 
evaluations should be organized and integrated. Finally, the results should be analyzed 
and the interpreted.  
The 4SPEM is built according to the four logical steps of evaluation which were 
mentioned earlier. The Current Evaluation Model (CEM) is built for the first step and 
checked whether or not the metrics were satisfied in each time period. Then, the 
Mathematical Model (MM) is built in order to calculate a single value representing the 
overall performance of the system called the Overall Performance Metric (OPM) and the 
model analyzed the calculated OPMs for the relevant terms. Next the Integrated Model 
(IM) is built to organize and integrate the findings of the CEM and the MM.  
Finally, the cumulated knowledge gathered from IM is analyzed and the results 
are interpreted as the fourth step.   
5) What should be the core objectives of an evaluation model? 
 The reviewed literature revealed that some models were introduced for the 
evaluation processes in PBL and some of the models are mentioned in the current study. 
Additionally the 4-SPEM is developed throughout the current study and according to the 
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cumulated knowledge. The objectives of a model which would be used in evaluation 
processes may be proposed as: 
• Simplicity : The model must be easy-to-understand and apply by the decision 
makers.  
• Reasonability: The assumptions and the results of a model must make sense to the 
decision maker. 
• Elasticity : A model should be dynamic and can be applied any kinds of PBL 
contracts. 
• Precision : The results should be precise to guide the decision maker. 
• Capability : A model should be capable of processing any number of metrics 
within many time periods. 
• Integrality : A model should be capable of integrating all metrics and calculate 
a single value as the overall performance. 
• Objectivity : The data processing and the outcomes of a model should be the 
same, no matter who performs them. Therefore, the model should be quantitative 
and relatively closed to subjective comments.   
6) Can the proposed model in this thesis be used for forecasting, or building new PBL 
contracts? 
 According to the scope of this thesis, the offered approach is reactive, so at the 
very beginning of a PBL contract concerned with a brand new system, this approach may 
not be an effective tool for forecasting.  
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 However, while the data are cumulatively gathered according to the metrics 
defined in the contract, the 4SPEM would be a highly effective tool in order to monitor 
the overall performance pattern of the contractor and the PBL-governed system. 
7) At which decision level may the proposed model be used? 
 First of all, this approach may be used both for operational-level decisions such 
as: reward and penalty decisions within a contract and at the strategic-level such as 
extending or terminating the contractual agreement with the same contractor or making a 
new contract about the same system with another contractor.  
 Secondly, the 4SPEM may be used to resolve the conflicts between the 
Government and the contractor if the individual metrics of a term conflicts with each 
other, such as one metric is above the defined limits whereas another is below.  
 Finally, the sub-components of the 4SPEM may be useful for specific evaluation 
needs within a contract. For example, we may use the MM in the process of calculating a 
single number for composite metrics such as the Logistics Foot Print (LFP).   
 
 
Relevant Findings and Recommendations 
 
 
First of all, the definition of metrics plays an important role in the successful 
implementation of PBL. Since the aim is satisfying the war fighter’s needs, the 
operational units at the customer side should have the responsibility and authority to 
define specifically what they need. Then the supporting units should tailor the metrics 
with a cause and effect relationship to fulfill the operational needs. If any of the 
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individual metrics could not be satisfied, the customer should penalize the contractor and 
even terminate the contract if necessary.  
Secondly, the evaluation processes should be determined and customized 
according to the defined metrics. Although developing an evaluation process prior to 
defining the metrics may be perceived as easier and pragmatic, metrics should not be 
defined according to an evaluation process. 
Third, subjective approaches such as weighting of metrics, or normalization of 
evaluation processes are not recommended at this time. Basically, favoring one metric 
over another, or making misassumptions about the limits of the metrics may lead both the 
Government and the contractor in the wrong direction.  
All the metrics should be perceived as: the defined needs of the war fighter, thus, 
none of the metrics should be treated differently than the others.  
 Finally, an evaluation process considering and calculating an overall performance 
value or score may let the decision makers gain more insights into the system they 
govern. Thus, overall performance metrics may play a more effective role in the decision-
making process than the individual metrics.  
 
 
Limitations 
 
 
First of all, PBL is a new and sensitive approach, because it both deals with 
critical weapon systems and there have been some failures experienced so far. Thus, 
finding a sponsorship and gathering specific raw data about PBL systems were limited 
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throughout the current study. Although a theoretical model is built in the current study, 
only published sources of data were obtrained. 
Secondly, the best practices are selected for the publications generally and they 
included very limited and aggregated data such as annual averages of related metrics, or 
comparisons of only some of the metrics that were defined in the contracts.  
 
 
Future Studies 
 
 
First of all, the 4SPEM model should be tested via more real life data. An 
application of this model to a PBL program that has intense real life data via a 
sponsorship may prove useful. 
Secondly, the best practices of PBL may be useful to concentrate on the efforts, 
however; considering other practices than the best ones and application of this model on 
them may help acquisition professionals to gain more insight into PBL contracts. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 PBL is an innovative approach to satisfy the highly elastic needs of the warfighter 
and a new approach, which may be adopted as an evaluation process in PBL is proposed 
in this thesis. The 4SPEM attempts to fill some of the gaps in the area of evaluation 
processes and may be a promising model. However, further studies depending on intense 
real life raw data via the sponsorships of the PBL Program Offices are needed to 
investigate the limitations and true benefits of this model.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Calculation of CQTFs and OPMs for Case 1 
)  
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Calculation of CQTFs and OPMs for Assessed Values 
(The calculations are depicted for 4 terms)  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Calculation of DLTF’s and OPMs for Case 1 
 
Calculation of DLTF’s and OPMs for Contractual Values 
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Calculation of DLTF’s and OPMs for Assessed Values 
(The calculations are depicted for 4 terms 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Sensitivity Analysis for the Conflict Situation  
4th Term   
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APPENDIX D 
 
Calculation of DLTF’s and OPMs for Case 2 
 
Calculation of DLTF’s and OPMs for Contractual Values 
(The calculations are depicted for 4 terms 
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Calculation of DLTF’s and OPMs for Assessed Values 
(The calculations are depicted for 4 terms) 
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APPENDIX E 
 
The Blue Dart  
 
1st Lt Ferit BUYUKGURAL, Student, AFIT 
Word count:  823 
 
 
Beyond any question the most remarkable global developments of the end of the 
20th Century and the beginning of the 21st Century were: the ending of the Cold War and 
the 9/11 attacks.  The Cold War resulted in the dissolution of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Warsaw Treaty. The collapse of the USSR resulted in 
large part due to the misallocation of their resources and inefficiencies of their system. 
Although there was one enemy, it was spread out geographically, making it hard for the 
USSR to carry the heavy burden of logistics support for its system. History clarifies that 
using a large conventional army makes war very expensive and requires a large support 
system to maintain effectiveness.   
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) resulted in implementation of 
the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) by the US and its allies. The concept of GWOT 
represents shifting from traditional army warfare to asymmetric warfare. Briefly, there’s 
no enemy country but there’s an enemy, there are no borders of conflict zone, but 
everywhere is potentially a conflict zone and showing presence of big conventional 
armed forces in an area is no more a show of superiority, but becoming a bigger target for 
the shadow enemy. The necessities of the new era mandated every country to allocate 
their resources relative to the new war concepts that are evolved from the previous ones 
and Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) is introduced under these conditions. 
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PBL is buying performance instead of buying materials and it is DoD's 
preferred product support approach in order to satisfy vitally important war-fighter needs. 
The mindset behind the PBL approach is: if the contractor knows how to produce a high-
technology product or service, then s/he knows how to sustain it better than the customer. 
But to what extend can we trust contractors and authorize them for our weapon system? 
Additionally, the elasticity of the needs makes it impossible to build a one-fits-all PBL 
contract template that would be applicable for a number of scenarios. If there’s no 
template, how should it be implemented correctly? How can anybody be sure about 
obtaining the best results via using PBL?  
The needs should be defined clearly by the operational units and the supporting 
units. Then the system should be monitored and governed accordingly. Basically, we 
should define the metrics concerned with the desired outcomes, come to an agreement 
with the contractor/s about the metrics that we define, collect the data of that metrics, and 
evaluate them in order to monitor our system. Otherwise, we would not be able to 
manage our system in a healthy manner. 
Both economic metrics such as: Cost per Unit Usage and non-economic metrics 
such as: Availability, Reliability, Logistics Foot Print and Logistics Response Time can 
be defined and tailored according to each individual program. However, evaluation of the 
success of a PBL contract gets harder proportional to the increased number of different 
types of metrics. According to the experts’ opinions, in most of the PBL contracts, the 
metrics are evaluated by collecting assessed values of the metrics within the 
contractually-defined terms. (e.g., average monthly values) and comparing assessed 
values of the metrics with the contractually targeted numbers of that metrics individually.  
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However, there are some issues concerned with this approach. First, every pair of 
comparisons includes a risk of making misjudgments statistically, and this risk increases 
as the number of pairs increase. Second, there may be conflicts between the metrics such 
as some metrics may be over performing while the others are underperforming, and it 
complicates the situation for the decision makers. Most recently, the US Government 
Accountability Office (US GAO) declared that although many performance metrics have 
been used in contracts, they have not been used in the decision making processes.  
This thesis investigates and proposes an alternative approach to monitor the 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) supported systems both at the individual metrics 
level and at the whole system level. The proposed approach is the 4-Step Process 
Evaluation Model (4-SPEM), consisting of 1) Building the Current Evaluation Model 
(CEM), 2) Building the Mathematical Model (MM), 3) Building the Integrated Model 
(IM) and 4)Analysis and Interpretation. Briefly, the defined metrics of the PBL contracts 
are assessed against individual target performance levels by time period (CEM).  The 
individual metrics are then integrated into a mathematical model (MM). The CEM and 
MM are integrated to assess results and gain insights at both the individual metric and 
overall system performance levels.  Analysis could include forecasting future 
performance based on performance to targets to identify potential issues.  
This approach may be used in operational-level decisions such as reward and 
penalty decisions within a contract or strategic-level decisions such as extending the 
contract with the same contractor, terminating the contract and negotiating 
with other contractors. In a more general sense, this approach could be applied to other 
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management and monitoring decisions that involve multiple metrics with different 
measurement characteristics across multiple time periods. 
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